Book contents
- Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World
- Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Do Patent Law Suits Target Invalid Patents?
- 2 Platform Procedure
- 3 Speedy Adjudication in Hard Cases and Low Settlement Rates in Easy Cases
- 4 How Lower Courts Respond to a Change in a Legal Rule
- 5 Career Judge System and Court Decision Biases
- 6 Judges Avoid Ex Post but Not Ex Ante Inefficiency
- 7 When Winning Is Not Enough
- 8 The Evolution of Case Influence in Modern Consumer Standard Form Contracts
- 9 Judging Insurance Antidiscrimination Law
- 10 Are Judges Harsher with Repeat Offenders?
- 11 Does Efficiency Trump Legality?
- Index
- References
9 - Judging Insurance Antidiscrimination Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2019
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Book contents
- Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World
- Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Do Patent Law Suits Target Invalid Patents?
- 2 Platform Procedure
- 3 Speedy Adjudication in Hard Cases and Low Settlement Rates in Easy Cases
- 4 How Lower Courts Respond to a Change in a Legal Rule
- 5 Career Judge System and Court Decision Biases
- 6 Judges Avoid Ex Post but Not Ex Ante Inefficiency
- 7 When Winning Is Not Enough
- 8 The Evolution of Case Influence in Modern Consumer Standard Form Contracts
- 9 Judging Insurance Antidiscrimination Law
- 10 Are Judges Harsher with Repeat Offenders?
- 11 Does Efficiency Trump Legality?
- Index
- References
Summary
Insurance companies use credit score to predict auto insurance risk. The theory being that people who are irresponsible in handling their finance, might also be irresponsible drivers. As a result, in states which ban discrimination based on credit score one would expect to see more fatal car accidents. In this study we seek to estimate the effect of introducing laws that prohibit credit score discrimination on the number of traffic fatalities, taking a standard differences-in-differences approach and using data on traffic fatalities from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). We find that prohibiting credit score discrimination is likely to not have an impact on insureds' primary behavior. Specifically, we find that in the first few years after the introduction of a law prohibiting credit score discrimination, there is a statistically insignificant increase in the number of traffic fatalities. Because the increase is not statistically significant we interpret the results as suggestive only.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the WorldEmpirical Inquires, pp. 223 - 241Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
References
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