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6 - Judges Avoid Ex Post but Not Ex Ante Inefficiency

Theory and Empirical Evidence from Taiwan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2019

By
Yun-chien Chang
Edited by
Yun-chien Chang
Yun-chien Chang
Affiliation:
Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
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Summary

This book chapter advances a hypothesis that judges tend to avoid ex post inefficiency (that is, inefficiency falling to litigants), but judges are less inclined to avoid ex ante inefficiency (that is, inefficiency incurred by future parties). Drawing on three empirical studies which the author has conducted on property cases rendered by courts in Taiwan, this chapter presents preliminary evidence to test this hypothesis. The three studies are consistent with the hypothesis, as judges avoid ex post inefficiency in two studies (co-ownership partition and building encroachment) but fail to avoid ex ante inefficiency in one study (trespass to land).

Keywords

Ex post inefficiencybuilding encroachmentco-ownership partitiontrespassunjust enrichmentex ante inefficiencyanticommonsequityallocative efficiencyjudicial behaviors
Type
Chapter
Information
Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World
Empirical Inquires
 , pp. 160 - 178
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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References

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