Selected Works of Michael Wallerstein The Political Economy of Inequality, Unions, and Social Democracy
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
- Part I Class Conflict, the State, and Economic Limits to Democracy
- 2 INTRODUCTION
- 3 THE STRUCTURE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN DEMOCRATIC CAPITALIST SOCIETIES
- 4 STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCE OF THE STATE ON CAPITAL
- 5 CAPITAL TAXATION WITH OPEN BORDERS
- Part II The Politics of Labor Organizations
- Part III Inequality and Redistribution
- Part IV Labor and the Nordic Model of Social Democracy
- Other Books in the Series
- References
4 - STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCE OF THE STATE ON CAPITAL
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2010
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
- Part I Class Conflict, the State, and Economic Limits to Democracy
- 2 INTRODUCTION
- 3 THE STRUCTURE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN DEMOCRATIC CAPITALIST SOCIETIES
- 4 STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCE OF THE STATE ON CAPITAL
- 5 CAPITAL TAXATION WITH OPEN BORDERS
- Part II The Politics of Labor Organizations
- Part III Inequality and Redistribution
- Part IV Labor and the Nordic Model of Social Democracy
- Other Books in the Series
- References
Summary
Capitalism is a system in which many scarce resources are owned privately, and decisions about allocating them are a private prerogative. Democracy is a system through which people as citizens may express preferences about allocating resources that they do not privately own. Hence the perennial question of political theory and of practical politics concerns the competence of these two systems with regard to each other. Is it possible for governments to control a capitalist economy? In particular, is it possible to steer the economy against the interests and preferences of those who control productive wealth?
The central and only distinctive claim of Marxist political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society. Capitalists are endowed with public power, power which no formal institutions can overcome (Luxemburg 1970; Pashukanis 1951). People may have political rights, they may vote, and governments may pursue popular mandates. But the effective capacity of any government to attain whatever are its goals is circumscribed by the public power of capital. The nature of political forces that come into office does not alter these limits, it is claimed, for they are structural – a characteristic of the system, not of the occupants of governmental positions nor of the winners of elections.
During the past 20 years Marxists have developed several theories to explain why all governments in capitalist societies are bound to act in the interests of capitalists.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Selected Works of Michael WallersteinThe Political Economy of Inequality, Unions, and Social Democracy, pp. 58 - 85Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008
References
Aubin, Christian, and Daniel Goyeau. 1986. Political Influences on Private Economic Behavior: Corporate Investment in France 1972–84. Institut de Recherche et d'Analyse Politico-Economiques, Université de Poitiers. Typescript.
1983. Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital. Journal of Economic Literature 21:905–40.Google Scholar
, and . 1985. A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government. Politics and Society 14:53–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1983. A Theory of Competition among Interest Groups for Political Influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 48:371–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1977. The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State. Socialist Revolution 33:6–27.Google Scholar
. 1980. The Economics of International Tax Avoidance. Rotterdam: International Series of the Rotterdam Institute for Fiscal Studies.Google Scholar
, and . 1977. Investment Incentives: A Comparative Analysis of the Systems in the EEC, the US, and Sweden. Deventer: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Busch, Winston C., and Robert J. Mackay. 1977. Private versus Public Sector Growth: A Collective Choice Approach. In The Sources of Government Growth, ed. . Durham: Duke University Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, David R. 1984. Social Democracy, Corporatism, and Labor Quiescence: The Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society. In Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. . Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Commission of the European Community. 1975. Tax Policy and Investment in the European Community. Brussels: author.
1985. Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of Public Economics 26:107–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 71:1467–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1978. On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity. British Journal of Political Science 8:153–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1979. Profits and Rates of Return. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development.Google Scholar
, and . 1984. The Taxation of Income from Capital: A Comparative Study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and West Germany. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1981. Fiscal Incentives for Investment in Industrial Countries. Bulletin of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 35:291–94.Google Scholar
, and . 1980. Strikes, Power, and Politics in Western Nations, 1900–76. Political Power and Social Theory 1:301–34.Google Scholar
Lange, Oskar. 1964. On the Economic Theory of Socialism. In On the Economic Theory of Socialism, ed. . New York: McGraw Hill.Google Scholar
Lewin, Leif. 1975. The Debate on Economic Planning in Sweden. In Sweden's Development from Poverty to Affluence, 1750–1970, ed. . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
1977. Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
1979. The Limits of Reformism: Parliamentary Socialism and the Marxist Theory of the State. British Journal of Sociology 30:267–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Offe, Claus. 1975. The Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formulation. In Stress and Contradiction in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. . Lexington: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1979. The Taxation of Net Wealth, Capital Transfers, and Capital Gains. Paris: author.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1983. International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. Paris: author.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1984. Tax Expenditures: A Review of the Issues and Country Practices. Paris: author.
. 1951. General Theory of Law and Marxism. In Soviet Legal Philosophy, trans. Hugh W. Babb. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
. 1976. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19:211–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pizzorno, Alessandro. 1978. Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict. In The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968, vol. 2, ed. and . London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Price, Waterhouse & Co. 1981. Tax Policy Incentives to Capital Formation. Prepared for the New York Stock Exchange study, U.S. Economic Performance in a Global Perspective. New York: New York Stock Exchange.
. 1985. Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . 1982a. The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies. American Political Science Review 76:215–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and . 1985. A Comment on Katz. Mahler, and Franz. American Political Science Review 80:508–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Peter B. Evans. 1985. The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention. In Bringing the State Back In, ed. , and . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schmitter, Philippe C. 1985. Neo-Corporatism and the State. In Political Economy of Corporatism, ed. . New York: St. Martin's.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shalev, Michael. 1983. The Social Democratic Model and Beyond: Two Generations of Comparative Research on the Welfare State. In Comparative Social Research. Vol. 6, ed. . Greenwich, CT: JAI.Google Scholar
. 1977. The Political Meaning of the Keynesian Revolution. In The End of the Kaynesian Era, ed. author. New York: Holmes & Meier.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1975. The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Wallerstein, Michael, and Adam Przeworski. 1988. Workers' Welfare and the Socialization of Capital. In Rationality and Revolution, ed. . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar