Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- About the authors
- Acknowledgements
- Authors' note
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Balance of capability
- 2 The landmark battles
- 3 The jungle patrol
- 4 Patrol contacts
- 5 The ambush battle
- 6 Bunker busting
- 7 Security contacts
- 8 Mine warfare
- 9 Comparisons: 1ATF infantry, SAS and other Free World forces
- 10 The combat effectiveness of 1ATF
- 11 Clearing the VC/PAVN from Phuoc Tuy
- Conclusion
- Annex: The computer databases behind this study
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - The combat effectiveness of 1ATF
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- About the authors
- Acknowledgements
- Authors' note
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Balance of capability
- 2 The landmark battles
- 3 The jungle patrol
- 4 Patrol contacts
- 5 The ambush battle
- 6 Bunker busting
- 7 Security contacts
- 8 Mine warfare
- 9 Comparisons: 1ATF infantry, SAS and other Free World forces
- 10 The combat effectiveness of 1ATF
- 11 Clearing the VC/PAVN from Phuoc Tuy
- Conclusion
- Annex: The computer databases behind this study
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The previous chapters have explained and measured the combat performance of 1ATF against the VC/PAVN and various friendly forces, including the US Army's infantry. The analysis shows that 1ATF ranked highly in terms of its combat performance in the low-intensity campaign. But to what extent did these fighting skills allow the Task Force to fulfil the mission it had been given?
On 17March 1966, the Australian Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant- General John Wilton, signed a military working agreement with General William Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), which set out 1ATF's role. The general mission of the Australian Task Force was to ‘carry out operations in coordination with and in support of operations of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the United States forces’. Under the agreement, the Task Force remained under the command of the Australian officer nominated as Commander, Australian Task Force Vietnam who was to be ‘responsive to, and under, the operational control’ of COMUSMACV. Although the Australian Task Force was never under the command of US forces, it was under the operational control of the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV). ‘Operational control’ entitled the Commander IIFFV to assign combat tasks to 1ATF. Such tasks could include any of the following: ‘To secure and dominate the assigned … TAOR in … Phuoc Tuy province’; ‘To conduct operations related to the security of Highway 15, as required’; ‘To conduct other operations in Phuoc Tuy province, as required’; and ‘To conduct operations anywhere in the ARVN … [III CTZ] and subsequently in the area of the adjacent province of Binh Tuan in the ARVN II CTZ as agreed by COMAFV and COMUSMACV’.
1ATF's first priority was to establish and secure a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) around its main base at Nui Dat. Once the relatively small TAOR around the Nui Dat base had been secured, the Task Force gradually expanded its TAOR into the more remote, jungle-covered areas of the province. By December 1966 the TAOR had expanded to cover most of the north-west quadrant of the province, including the Nui Dinh and Nui Thi Vai features overlooking Route 15 and most of Route 2.
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- Information
- The Search for Tactical Success in VietnamAn Analysis of Australian Task Force Combat Operations, pp. 214 - 230Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015