Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- A Note on Terminology
- Map
- Introduction
- 1 Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1332–1357
- 2 The Organisation of War
- 3 Dramatis Personae: Military Biographies
- 4 The Conduct and Realities of War
- 5 Perceptions of War
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Warfare in History
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- A Note on Terminology
- Map
- Introduction
- 1 Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1332–1357
- 2 The Organisation of War
- 3 Dramatis Personae: Military Biographies
- 4 The Conduct and Realities of War
- 5 Perceptions of War
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Warfare in History
Summary
When war in Scotland recommenced in 1332, it appeared rather quickly that the Bruce establishment of the kingdom was in danger of collapse. The twin threats of a return to Balliol kingship, and English conquest of southern Scotland, must have appeared likely outcomes in the aftermath of the crushing Bruce battlefield defeats at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. And yet the war continued. Edward Balliol, for all that he retained support in Scotland, and could count on the military assistance of English field armies, was unable to impose his will sufficiently on the Scottish people. Edward III, despite his military effort and personal involvement in the war with Scotland, could not ensure the stability of the Balliol regime, or conquer Scotland outright. Indeed he was unable even to conquer southern Scotland and retain it against Bruce counter-attacks. Why then, after all the setbacks that befell the Bruce Scottish war effort, were they ultimately successful in repulsing attempts at a Balliol/English takeover?
The Bruce Scottish war effort was a well organised and, more often than not, efficient operation. Leadership lay in the hands of either the king or, in his absence, the various men who were appointed Guardians to act in his stead. In the aftermath of catastrophic defeats, for example, immediately after Halidon Hill or Neville's Cross, war leadership suffered from a power vacuum effect. This was, however, almost always a short-term problem. With the return of leadership in the form of a newly-appointed Guardian, wartime endeavour was once more pushed forward effectively. Scotland's leading military figures were capable of fighting small-scale warfare in their localities, undertaking such activities most notably under Robert the Steward, when control of the war was devolved upon more military-minded individuals. Bruce Scottish success during the conflict as a whole came about, however, as a result of a national war effort. The victory over the forces of David Strathbogie at Culblean in 1335, for example, witnessed the combination of northern levies with the knightly retinues of southern Scotland. The first raid into England in 1340 involved the combined forces of the earls of March and Sutherland. In all three campaigns that led to pitched battles, the kingdom of Scotland was represented as an entity as men from all regions served in the armies involved.
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- Scotland's Second War of Independence, 1332–1357 , pp. 239 - 244Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2016