Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T03:55:11.592Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Transcendent Speculation on the ApparentDeliberateness in the Fate of the Individual

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2022

Sabine Roehr
Affiliation:
New Jersey City University
Christopher Janaway
Affiliation:
University of Southampton
Get access

Summary

Τò ϵἰϰῆ oὔϰ ἐστι ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ἀƛƛὰ

μία ἁρμoνία ϰαὶ τάζις.

[Chance does not exist in life, but a singleharmony and order]

Plotinus, Ennead IV, 4, 35

Although the thoughts to be imparted here yield no firmresult, indeed, might be called a mere metaphysicalfantasy, I have not been able to bring myself toabandon themto oblivion, since by some they will bewelcomed, at the very least as a comparison withtheir own thoughts nurtured on the same matter. Yetthey too have to be reminded that everything aboutthese thoughts is doubtful, not only the solutionbut indeed the problem. Accordingly, we can expectanything but definite explanations, rather the mereairing of a very obscure state of affairs, whichnevertheless, from time to time, may have forceditself on every one of us during the course of ourown life, or looking back on it. Our meditations onthis may even not be much more than a groping andfumbling in the dark, where we are aware ofsomething being there, yet do not really know whereor what it is. If I should nevertheless adopt apositive or even dogmatic tone at times, let it besaid here once and for all that this happens only inorder not to become dull and redundant through theconstant repetition of formulas of doubt andconjecture, and that the following is not to betaken seriously.

The belief in special providence, or else in thesupernatural guidance of events in the course of anindividual's life, has been universally popular atall times, and occasionally is even found, firmlyand unshakably, in thinking minds averse to allsuperstition, even without any connection to anydefinite dogmas. – First of all, we can object tothis belief that, in the manner of all belief ingods, it does not have its source in cognition, but in thewill, and isprimarily the child of our neediness. For the dataprovided merely by cognition might be ascribed to the factthat chance, which plays us a hundred cruel tricksthat seem intentional in their maliciousness, oncein a while turns out to be particularly favourable,or indirectly provides very well for us.

Type
Chapter
Information
Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena
Short Philosophical Essays
, pp. 177 - 197
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×