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Ethics 1812/13: Doctrine of virtue and doctrine of duties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Robert B. Louden
Affiliation:
University of Southern Maine
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Summary

Introduction

1 The object of the doctrine of virtue is not directly the totality of reason as against the totality of nature, but reason in the human individual.

2 On the one hand, then, [it is] everything that is posited in the highest good, because reason cannot be present in any other way; on the other hand, however, it excludes everything that is a product; that is, not only formed external nature, but also the organism as something that has been formed; for it features here only as agent.

3 In passing, then: what about the difference between virtue and talent? From the point of view of the highest good, we would say: so much virtue equals so much talent, and vice versa. Not from the point of view of the doctrine of virtue, however. For the virtue of the one has a share in the talent of the Other, i.e. of the morally formed individual.

4 If there should be anything to say about virtue, it must be both one thing and many things, so that it is a nonsensical question to ask which of the two it is. The only question which remains is, in what sense it is one thing and in what sense many.

5 We might say that it is one thing to the extent that the highest good is one thing, and many things to the extent that the highest good consists of diverse spheres.

6 This cannot be the case, however, partly because these four spheres have a common root in the family, which also forms one sphere, so that in virtue, by means of which the human being exists within a family, the other virtues, by means of which he exists in every other sphere, would become a single entity again.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

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