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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 December 2018

Sean Ingham
Sean Ingham
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University of California, San Diego
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Rule by Multiple Majorities
A New Theory of Popular Control
 , pp. 178 - 186
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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  • Bibliography
  • Sean Ingham, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: Rule by Multiple Majorities
  • Online publication: 28 December 2018
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108683821.009
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  • Bibliography
  • Sean Ingham, University of California, San Diego
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  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108683821.009
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  • Bibliography
  • Sean Ingham, University of California, San Diego
  • Book: Rule by Multiple Majorities
  • Online publication: 28 December 2018
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108683821.009
Available formats
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