By the beginning of 1920 the situation of General Denikin's Volunteer Army appeared grave and it was likely the White forces would be thrown back into the Crimean Peninsula which would now be their only refuge. Admiral de Robeck, strongly committed to the White cause, argued that the Crimea should be held at all costs, if only because it might serve as a diversion and prevent the whole of Bolshevik strength being employed against Poland in the west or prevent the Bolsheviks moving through the Caucasus into Asia Minor. There was also a humanitarian motive, a natural reluctance to abandon those whom the British had hitherto supported to Bolshevik vengeance [51]. Both de Robeck and General Milne, commander of the ‘Army of the Black Sea’, believed the situation might yet be salvaged if British troops, even a small number, were committed to bolster the White Russian forces at Odessa, Novorossisk, the Crimea and Baku. British forces at the latter would permit the Navy to resume control of the Caspian Flotilla, now in the uncertain hands of the fledgling Azerbaijan Republic [54, 55]. The Admiralty authorised de Robeck to proceed to the Black Sea with all available ships and prepare to send a party to take over Denikin's ships in the Caspian, but delayed a decision on holding the Crimea [52, 53]. The Cabinet decided, however, that no British troops would be moved to defend any Russian ports or territory [56]. Nonetheless, the British would carry on an evacuation from Novorossisk to the Crimea in order to fulfil the guarantee made by Sir Halford Mackinder, British Commissioner for South Russia, concerning the safety of Russian officers’ families and children [57]. De Robeck pointed out, however, that this would not be a real fulfilment of the Mackinder guarantee, for the women and children would not be in a place of safety since the Crimea might fall in a few weeks. He therefore made arrangements for the eventual evacuation of refugees beyond Russian territory [58]. De Robeck had doubts about the wisdom of sending a navy party to the Caspian unless British troops could occupy Baku and the safety of the Batoum–Baku railway could be guaranteed. Nevertheless, in April the Admiralty ordered the detachment to the Caspian.