Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps
- Abbreviations & Acronyms
- Preface to Revised Edition
- Maps
- 1 The Historical Structure of North-South Relations
- 2 British Overrule 1899–1947
- 3 Nationalism, Independence & the First Civil War 1942–72
- 4 The Addis Ababa Agreement & the Regional Governments 1972–83
- 5 The Beginnings of the Second Civil War 1983–85
- Interlude
- 6 The Momentum of Liberation 1986–91
- 7 The SPLA Split Surviving Factionalism
- 8 The Segmentation of SPLA-United & the Nuer Civil War
- 9 Mutiple Civil Wars
- 10 The War Economy & the Politics of Relief
- 11 Comprehensive Peace or Temporary Truce?
- Epilogue: War in Sudan’s New South & New War in South Sudan
- Bibliographic Essay
- Appendix: Chronology Of Events
- Index
7 - The SPLA Split Surviving Factionalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 June 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps
- Abbreviations & Acronyms
- Preface to Revised Edition
- Maps
- 1 The Historical Structure of North-South Relations
- 2 British Overrule 1899–1947
- 3 Nationalism, Independence & the First Civil War 1942–72
- 4 The Addis Ababa Agreement & the Regional Governments 1972–83
- 5 The Beginnings of the Second Civil War 1983–85
- Interlude
- 6 The Momentum of Liberation 1986–91
- 7 The SPLA Split Surviving Factionalism
- 8 The Segmentation of SPLA-United & the Nuer Civil War
- 9 Mutiple Civil Wars
- 10 The War Economy & the Politics of Relief
- 11 Comprehensive Peace or Temporary Truce?
- Epilogue: War in Sudan’s New South & New War in South Sudan
- Bibliographic Essay
- Appendix: Chronology Of Events
- Index
Summary
Internal differences within the SPLA
The South's first civil war had been plagued by factional fighting between guerrilla movements, and the SPLA's policy of preventing military factionalism was a direct attempt to apply lessons learnt from this past. In its suppression of internal dissent and its attack on military rivals, the SPLA followed a pattern similar to that of many other contemporary African liberation movements. The SPLA's military organization was the foundation of its success on the ground. It achieved far greater centralization and cohesion than the old Anyanya and maintained an expanding ability to take and hold territory far beyond that of any of the Southern guerrilla movements of the 1960s.
The political price of the policy was that the leadership relied on force rather than persuasion to maintain cohesion. Dissenters were removed while the causes of dissent were not, and the civil base of the Movement was neglected in favour of the military organization. Civil administration was most advanced in those areas providing the strongest popular support (Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile and much of Lakes and Jonglei), and where political mobilization was easiest. In the remoter regions of the southern Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains, SPLA presence before 1989 was seasonal, at best. In the territories formerly opposed to the SPLA (Eastern Equatoria and Pibor) administration was more military occupation than popular liberation.
As long as Garang had Mengistu's support he was able to exert considerable control over the Movement's hierarchy. After its founding meeting in 1983 the SPLM held no national convention until 1994, and civilian figures, such as the respected judge Martin Majier or the veteran politician Joseph Oduho, had scarcely any role in the formulation or implementation of policy. The central organizing body of the Movement, the Political- Military High Command, whose members were appointed by Garang, was not convened in full between 1986 and 1991. In 1987 it became a doubletiered structure of full (or permanent) members and alternate commanders with limited voting rights and duties. Garang was often aloof or unapproachable, frequently on the move between the Movement's headquarters in Addis Ababa and Boma, its bases around Itang or in the Sudan, or visiting the capitals of friendly countries.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil WarsOld Wars and New Wars (Expanded 3rd Edition), pp. 91 - 110Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2016