Residual guerrilla warfare, 1975–82

Sudanese dissidents & the Ethiopian connection

Most of the Anyanya guerrillas had accepted the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, even if they retained a suspicion of, or were disappointed by, the integration process. Only a few remained in Ethiopia in their own camps, but they were not a significant military or political force, even after they were joined by various mutineers in 1975–6. The Addis Ababa Agreement also represented a rapprochement between the Sudan and Ethiopia (the Sudan had, along with many Arab nations, supported Eritrean separatists), so Haile Selassie's government imposed some control over border activity. This did not survive the Emperor's fall in 1974, when his government was replaced by a pro-socialist military Derg (committee) that subsequently came under the control of Mengistu Haile-Mariam. The Sudan came under increased pressure from various Arab states to renew its support for the Eritreans, and this affected Ethiopia's attitude towards its neighbour.

In 1976 Mading de Garang, a former guerrilla spokesmen and then regional Minister for Information, led a Sudanese government delegation to Ethiopia and was told quite explicitly by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister that unless the Sudan ceased supplying the Eritrean rebels, Ethiopia would give active support to the Anyanya remnants in Ethiopia who had refused to accept the Addis Ababa Agreement. Nimairi's support for the Eritreans, and subsequently for anti-Derg forces, continued despite this warning. Ethiopia's support for various Sudanese dissidents dates from 1976. In addition to arming and training Southern guerrillas, colloquially known as Anyanya-2, the Mengistu government enabled Sadiq al-Mahdi to beam anti-Nimairi radio broadcasts to the Sudan after the failure of his 1976 coup attempt.

Ethiopian and (briefly) Libyan support for Southern guerrillas, and later for the SPLM/SPLA, brought internal Sudanese discontent into the arena of the Cold War. The SPLA's early dependence on Mengistu's government was used by some officials in Washington to justify continued military support to Khartoum. Given the configuration of international politics in the early 1980s, Southerners had few other options open to them. The Sudan's support for the Camp David Accord meant that Israel would not support Southern guerrillas, as it had done towards the end of the first civil war. Uganda under Obote also would not give sanctuary or support to southern Sudanese, as they were seen to have been a prop to Idi Amin's regime after 1972.