The right of self-determination of peoples is one of the most successful legal–political watchwords of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It is one of only a few slogans that have an exclusively positive connotation. By the same token, it practically necessitates hypocrisy. Even if one is skeptical or has a negative assessment of the matter, one must still lay claim to the concept. Those who publically reject it appear as deniers of a human right. The question is not whether it is an appropriate watchword, but rather whether one can define it in such a way that one is entitled to it oneself. In this respect, it is best comparable to human rights and democracy. But within this group of concepts, it has a privileged position over the others in many respects. This privileged position has, however, only accrued to it in recent decades.

Whereas reference to human self-determination can be traced back to the late eighteenth century and in isolated cases even to the late seventeenth century, the phrase “self-determination of peoples” arose first in the middle of the nineteenth century. Although a right was spoken of, initially it was not a legally actionable right to which a beneficiary – a subject (the people) – was entitled. At best, one could speak of a principle, an axiom, or a demand that peoples could make without the addressee being obligated to grant the demand.

This general principle then accumulated so much prestige that the preeminent legal–political ideal concept developed, a concept that no one could afford to view negatively. The ideal formulated therein is that every human being has the right to live in the state, or more comprehensively in the politically organized community, of one's own choice.

As attractive as the ideal is, its realization seems just as hopeless. For viable political entities to arise, a certain amount of stability and territorial contiguity is necessary. No one can guarantee that the cumulation of the individual wishes of those affected can bring forth such a result. An international order in accordance with individual wishes for political affiliation is not a contradiction in itself; therefore a corresponding promise is hard to rescind. The history of the right of self-determination of peoples thereby becomes the attempt to support this right rhetorically time and again, while in practice to restrict it in accordance with one's own respective needs.