The fourth chapter offers an intermediate conclusion. Despite all of the criticism dualism and monism have faced, their persistence is remarkable. Both are still referred to in many textbooks, they are present in case law and in scholarly work. Also in practice, many (national) legal orders are still often referred to as being “dualistic” or “monistic.” Thus, there is a need to make the critical points as clear as possible in order to explain why they – as originally conceived – are of no help in answering the question posed by this book. Moreover, the preceding chapter holds that global legal pluralism cannot offer a satisfying normative account for norm conflict resolution between international, EU and national law either. Hence, prescriptive proposals to solve legal conflicts arising from different legal orders on the global plane are better not termed “pluralistic.” Rather this chapter suggests that it is more precise to refer to a necessarily common framework that addresses the question of how those conflicts should be resolved together or at least in a way acceptable to all parties.