Introduction

Disagreements over marine resources are not new. Disputes over ocean fisheries date back at least to the late sixteenth century, and their causes have been both political and economic. The main developments in solving such problems at an international level took place during the twentieth century, especially after the Second World War. Due to the traditionally open access to ocean fisheries, it took several decades to reach an international agreement on their exploitation.

During this period regional bodies developed regulatory systems to attempt to solve problems of over-fishing in international waters. One of these organisations was the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), which during the 1970s was a forum for negotiation between states on the management of North Sea herring. This particular stock was badly over-harvested, and nations that fished in the North Sea were aware of the need to establish regulations to deal with the issue. Unfortunately, however, this attempt to reach a reasonable collective agreement failed. In this paper, which is part of my ongoing research, I will offer some preliminary explanations for this failure. Moreover, since collective agreement on fisheries policy is very hard to achieve, it is important to examine the conflicts and arguments that emerged during the negotiation process.

Theoretical Overview

The postwar period has been marked by the dismantling of the famous doctrine of “the freedom of the seas” and, in its place, the emergence of exclusivity and strict regulation of the exploitation of living marine resources. By extending their fishing limits, coastal states have acquired sovereignty over international waters, which has enabled them to exclude or control non-citizens in the exploitation of the resources inside their limits. This process includes changes in existing institutions which, according to Douglass North, “are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.“

On the other hand, there have also been attempts to establish other kinds of institutional arrangements. These have focussed on solving the problem of over-exploitation in international seas by turning them into governed international waters, or commons, through the establishment of regulations, usually in the form of a property-right system.