Delegating discretion to resolve controversy

Decision outcomes differ from each other in the extent to which they specify the details of policies to be followed by implementers. Some decision outcomes contain detailed rules that give implementers little or no opportunity to interpret decisions in different ways. Other decision outcomes delegate considerable room for manoeuvre to implementers. In this chapter, a decision outcome is said to delegate discretion to an implementer if the implementer can take one of two or more policy actions and still comply with the law of which the decision outcome is part.

In most political systems, decision makers delegate at least some discretionary power to implementers (e.g., Hawkins et al. 2006). Decision makers often argue that this is appropriate, because implementers can use technical knowledge that decision makers lack to fill in the details of policies. Moreover, implementers with discretionary power can react dynamically to unforeseen developments within the same general policy framework set by their political masters. The danger of delegating discretionary power to implementers is that implementers may carry out policies that are not in line with decision makers’ preferences, behaviour known as ‘bureaucratic drift’. If implementers have more information about policies and their effects than decision makers, it may be difficult for decision makers to detect and sanction policy drift. Consequently, in political systems around the world, decision makers must balance the costs and benefits of delegating discretionary power to implementers when formulating decision outcomes.