Book contents
- Resisting Extortion
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Resisting Extortion
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Maps
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Part I Resistance to Criminal Extortion
- Part II Everyday Resistance and Piecemeal Vigilantism
- Part III Collective Vigilantism and the Coproduction of Order
- 5 Collective Vigilantism
- 6 The Coproduction of Order
- 7 Summing Up and Next Steps
- Appendix Researching Resistance to Criminal Extortion
- References
- Index
- Series page
6 - The Coproduction of Order
from Part III - Collective Vigilantism and the Coproduction of Order
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2021
- Resisting Extortion
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Resisting Extortion
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Maps
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Part I Resistance to Criminal Extortion
- Part II Everyday Resistance and Piecemeal Vigilantism
- Part III Collective Vigilantism and the Coproduction of Order
- 5 Collective Vigilantism
- 6 The Coproduction of Order
- 7 Summing Up and Next Steps
- Appendix Researching Resistance to Criminal Extortion
- References
- Index
- Series page
Summary
This chapter continues the comparative analysis of the two municipalities in Michoacán by leveraging within-case shifts in the availability of police as allies for victims’ resistance efforts. In both cases the variants of collective vigilantism produced “bottom-up” purges of the local police who had been captured by criminal actors. Victims responded to this shift in strategic conditions by pursuing the coproduction of local order. Yet the projects of coproduction varied in their structures and practices in ways that reflected the enduring differences in the nature of the local political economies and the legacies of differing forms of collective vigilantism. Avocado sector victims employed their robust sectoral organization and joined with governing authorities to jointly shape local order, whereas the legacy of decentralized collective vigilantism and weak ties to governing authorities in the berry sector resulted in violent competition between coalitions of armed victims and politicians to obtain political power during elections.
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- Resisting ExtortionVictims, Criminals, and States in Latin America, pp. 155 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022