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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2024

Mona Simion
Mona Simion
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow

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Information
Resistance to Evidence , pp. 197 - 214
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024
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  • Bibliography
  • Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Resistance to Evidence
  • Online publication: 16 February 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009298537.018
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  • Bibliography
  • Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Resistance to Evidence
  • Online publication: 16 February 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009298537.018
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Bibliography
  • Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Resistance to Evidence
  • Online publication: 16 February 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009298537.018
Available formats
×