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14 - The Truth of the market

from Part V - Conceptual Utopia: the market after the market

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2016

By
Maria Rosaria Ferrarese
Edited by
Bertram Lomfeld ,
Alessandro Somma  and
Peer Zumbansen
Bertram Lomfeld
Affiliation:
Freie Universität Berlin
Alessandro Somma
Affiliation:
University of Ferrar
Peer Zumbansen
Affiliation:
King's College London
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Type
Chapter
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Reshaping Markets
Economic Governance, the Global Financial Crisis and Liberal Utopia
 , pp. 319 - 346
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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