Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Dedication
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Editorial Note
- Introduction: France and its Wars, 1494–1559
- 1 One World is Not Enough: Kings, Ministers and Decisions on Policy and Strategy in Renaissance France
- 2 The High Command, Planning and the Army as a Whole
- 3 Cavalry and the Nobility at War
- 4 The Birth of the French Infantry
- 5 Foreign Mercenaries in the Service of the King of France
- 6 The Artillery Revolution, Fortifications and Siege Warfare
- 7 The Field of Battle
- 8 The Sinews of War: Military Administration and Finance
- 9 The Impact of War: Supply, Garrisons, Logistics and the Problem of Disorder
- 10 War, Propaganda, History and Public Opinion
- 11 War and Renaissance Culture: Music and the Visual Arts
- 12 War, Renaissance Culture and the Literary World
- Conclusion: Until It Fill the Whole World?
- Appendix 1 French troop strength and battles during the Italian wars (1494–1529)
- Bibliography
- Index
- Warfare in History
2 - The High Command, Planning and the Army as a Whole
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Dedication
- Preface and acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Editorial Note
- Introduction: France and its Wars, 1494–1559
- 1 One World is Not Enough: Kings, Ministers and Decisions on Policy and Strategy in Renaissance France
- 2 The High Command, Planning and the Army as a Whole
- 3 Cavalry and the Nobility at War
- 4 The Birth of the French Infantry
- 5 Foreign Mercenaries in the Service of the King of France
- 6 The Artillery Revolution, Fortifications and Siege Warfare
- 7 The Field of Battle
- 8 The Sinews of War: Military Administration and Finance
- 9 The Impact of War: Supply, Garrisons, Logistics and the Problem of Disorder
- 10 War, Propaganda, History and Public Opinion
- 11 War and Renaissance Culture: Music and the Visual Arts
- 12 War, Renaissance Culture and the Literary World
- Conclusion: Until It Fill the Whole World?
- Appendix 1 French troop strength and battles during the Italian wars (1494–1529)
- Bibliography
- Index
- Warfare in History
Summary
The King had expressly summoned all the power of his kingdom, legionaries, companies, garrisons, bands of foot and all other men serving in war.
Kings and generals: the High Command
The king, as commander-in-chief, sometimes led the army in person and, while the idea of a king risking his life on the battlefield was occasionally deplored, most accepted Pierre Gringore's assertion that ‘a prince present in battle is worth a hundred.’ All kings from Charles VII to Henri II appeared at the head of their armies and Charles VIII, Louis XII and Francis I actively commanded on the battlefield. Henri II was already experienced in war at his accession. How effective was this command? Louis XII seems to have had the sense to realise his limitations as a battlefield commander. It is often thought that Louis himself commanded the army for his first invasion of Italy in 1499 but, though he rode in triumph into Milan in October 1499, command was in effect exercised by Stuart d’Aubigny, Ligny and Trivulzio. The argument went that it was beneath the dignity of a King of France to command in person against a Sforza. Louis did have some abilities and was in many ways a ‘roi chevalier’ like Francis I and Henri II. D’Auton insists that it was the King who, in the battle with the Genoese outside the walls in 1507, ‘then arranged his battles and himself set all his men in place’. Louis commanded the ‘battle’ and, according to d’Auton it was he who took the decision to attack late in the day against the advice of his commanders. At Agnadello on 14 May 1509, Louis was at the head of the army and, though the initial attack was conducted by marshal de Caumont, it was the King's arrival and the outflanking attack by Bayard that won the day after a close-fought battle.
Francis was as much, if not more, of a ‘roi chevalier’, who vindicated his status as warlord by his early victory at Marignano. Brantôme recalled that he had ‘so well carried out the office of king, captain and man-at-arms that it could not be said which he did best.’ Though personally brave, he met mixed success on the battlefield. Whether this was a result of his own inadequacy remains uncertain, though Brantôme attributed it to ‘fortune.’
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- Information
- Renaissance France at WarArmies, Culture and Society, c. 1480-1560, pp. 42 - 66Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2008