The remembered self can refer to memory of past concepts of self or to the way memory of the past structures and changes present construal of self. These two senses of the remembered self no doubt interact to give shape and definition to the present self, but a full discussion of both aspects would be more than I could accomplish in a short essay. Consequently, I want to confine the present discussion to the way memory of the past structures and changes present self-construal. Students of the self only vaguely understand this process. Probably the best articulations of the relation between memory and self grow out of work in narrative psychology (see Bruner, 1990; Howard, 1991; Spence, 1982; Viederman, 1979). From the perspective of a narrative psychologist, selves are construed through autobiographical narrating. Starting with the observation that people engage continuously in the interpretation of present and past experiences, narrative psychologists contend that this interpretation takes the form of story telling. For them, the self plays the role of both protagonist and narrator in these stories, and through these roles, people come to terms with who and what they are.

Memory contributes to self-actualizing narrative telling because it serves as the raw material for the narrative. As raw material, memories do not constitute the self. Without the interpretive molding provided by narrative telling, memories would have little chance of being much more than unconnected bits of information. My recollections of past jobs, loves, and tragedies are each fairly meaningless memories unless they can be placed in a larger context.