In the preparation of this volume the question was put to me whether forgetting in autobiographical memory is of a self-serving nature; whether the forgetting and remembering of events from one's own life serve the selfish goal of preserving a positive self-image. Suggestions of that kind were made by Greenwald (1980) and of course before by a large number of clinical psychologists. Ross (1989) contested this view, arguing that what looks like a preservation of self-esteem may in reality be only a preservation of consistency. But even that would be an instance of selfish forgetting. Is there any empirical evidence that autobiographical memories are tainted by such phenomena?

While reflecting upon this question, it occurred to me that the relationship between autobiographical memory and the self can be rather complex. Autobiographical memory is a loose term, ill founded in psychological theory. It refers to a type of experiment in which questions about one's personal life are asked; it definitely does not refer to a specific sort of memory store or mechanism. The self or selves, on the other hand, refer to highly abstract concepts, not to a specific type of experiment. Although it is true that the existence and maintenance of these concepts rely on memory, it is not obvious that the memory of concepts has anything to do with autobiographical memory. It is possible that there is no relationship between autobiographical memory and the remembered self, one being defined by an experimental method, the other being a rather broad and abstract concept.