The Cambridge Series in the Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions is built around attempts to answer two central questions: How do institutions evolve in response to individual incentives, strategies, and choices; and how do institutions affect the performance of political and economic systems? The scope of the series is comparative and historical rather than international or specifically American, and the focus is positive rather than normative.

This volume, an outcome of a research project initiated by the World Bank, explores regulation of telecommunications in five countries. The editors' objective was to make a comparative assessment of the impact of core political and social institutions on regulatory structures and performance in order to derive some generalizations about what works and doesn't work in telecommunications regulation. The study is rich in original insights into the interplay between specific institutional endowments of a polity, governance structures, design characteristics, and consequent industry performance. More than anything else the study demonstrates the usefulness of the new institutional economics as a tool to analyze regulatory structures and aid in the development of sound regulatory practice.