Chapter 6 retells the story of the Greek public debt, recognised as sustainable for political reasons back in 2010. Because subsequent bailouts have been based on the same economically erroneous assumption, they have resulted in lending hundreds of billions euros to an unviable borrower. This chapter also argues that debt restructuring options discussed recently by Greece’s official creditors are not in a position to sufficiently address this country’s debt problem. Deeper public debt restructuring will arguably be self-defeating unless it is conflated with a Eurozone exit of this country. More generally, the same applies to all the countries unable to regain economic resilience within the harness of the single monetary policy, Italy being the next most obvious example. This chapter also argues that the reinstatement of national currencies in the countries unable to effectively control public debt and unemployment in the monetary union would be more doable economically, legally and politically than it is routinely admitted. Most important of all, it would remove a serious burden of overappreciated currency imposed on the domestic economic activity.