Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- 6.1 Transaction cost determinants of “unfair” contractual arrangements
- 6.2 A relational exchange perspective on the employment relationship
- 6.3 Liquidated damages versus penalties: sense or nonsense?
- 6.4 Further thoughts on penalty clauses
- Questions and notes on power and penalty clauses
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
6.4 - Further thoughts on penalty clauses
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Readings in the economics of contract law
- Part I Some preliminaries
- Part II Contract law and the least cost avoider
- Part III The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages
- Part IV The lost-volume seller puzzle
- Part V Specific performance and the cost of completion
- Part VI Power, governance, and the penalty clause puzzle
- 6.1 Transaction cost determinants of “unfair” contractual arrangements
- 6.2 A relational exchange perspective on the employment relationship
- 6.3 Liquidated damages versus penalties: sense or nonsense?
- 6.4 Further thoughts on penalty clauses
- Questions and notes on power and penalty clauses
- Part VII Standard forms and warranties
- Part VIII Duress, preexisting duty, and good faith modification
- Part IX Impossibility, related doctrines, and price adjustment
- Questions and notes on impossibility and price adjustment
- References
- Index of cases
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
A penalty is just one element of the consideration for a contract. The party received something of value because it was willing to take the risk of having the penalty imposed upon it. Courts do not, in general, inquire into the adequacy of the consideration for a contract; yet if it is possible to characterize an element of a contract as a penalty, the court will scrutinize the adequacy of that element of the consideration more carefully.
The judicial hostility to penalties goes too far. Society would, I am quite certain, be better off if it adopted a more accommodating approach to liquidated damages and resisted the temptation to eliminate the right to terminate a relationship at will (if the initial contract allows for such terminations). There has been considerable effort to protect both employees and franchisees from such terminations, and courts have become more sympathetic to these efforts in recent years. Some of the hostility is undoubtedly due to a lack of appreciation of the mutual benefits to parties of arranging their affairs so that one could impose costs on the other. Nonetheless, I suspect that more than ignorance is involved.
It seems clear that the acceptability of certain penalties is culturally dependent. Society will simply not enforce certain penalties because that society perceives them to be wrong. You cannot contractually agree that in the event of breach you will become the other party's slave. At least you can't in twentieth-century America. It seems reasonable to take these social attitudes as given “tastes.” That is not to say that economic analysis will be useless in generating propositions about these attitudes. It is probably true that “morality” is income elastic.
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- Readings in the Economics of Contract Law , pp. 161 - 163Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982