Contents

pp v-viii

Preface

pp ix-xii

Readings in the economics of contract law

pp xiii-xiv

Part I - Some preliminaries

pp 1-3

1.1 - Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study

pp 4-15

1.2 - Relational exchange: economics and complex contracts

pp 16-20

1.3 - Production functions, transactions costs, and the new institutionalism

pp 21-23

1.4 - The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism

pp 24-28

1.5 - A treatise on the law of marine insurance and general average, volume I

pp 29-30

1.6 - The economics of moral hazard: comment

pp 31-32

1.7 - The economics of moral hazard: further comment

pp 33-34

1.8 - Efficient rent seeking

pp 35-42

Questions and notes on rent seeking

pp 43-50

Part II - Contract law and the least cost avoider

pp 51-52

2.1 - Unity in tort, contract, and property: the model of precaution

pp 53-60

2.2 - The mitigation principle: toward a general theory of contractual obligation (1)

pp 61-68

2.3 - Relational exchange, contract law, and the Boomer problem (1)

pp 69-71

Questions and notes on the least cost avoider

pp 72-74

Part III - The expectation interest, the reliance interest, and consequential damages

pp 75-76

3.1 - The reliance interest in contract damages

pp 77-79

3.2 - Note on price information and enforcement of the expectation interest

pp 80-83

Questions and notes on protecting the property interest in the price

pp 84-85

3.3 - The contract–tort boundary and the economics of insurance

pp 86-91

3.4 - Notes on the reliance interest

pp 92-98

Questions and notes on fault, consequential damages, and reliance

pp 99-104

Part IV - The lost-volume seller puzzle

pp 105-105

4.1 - An economic analysis of the lost-volume retail seller

pp 106-113

Questions and notes on the seller's lost profits

pp 114-120

Part V - Specific performance and the cost of completion

pp 121-121