Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Acknowledgements
- Contents
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I The Theory
- Part II The Comparative Case Study
- Chapter 7 Pol Pot and the Destruction of Cambodia
- Chapter 8 Milosevic and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
- Chapter 9 The Rationality of Pol Pot
- Chapter 10 The Rationality of Milosevic
- Chapter 11 Military Intervention: Lessons Learned from the Wars with NATO and Vietnam
- Chapter 12 Lessons Learned for the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect
- Chapter 13 Conclusion: A Piece of the Puzzle
- References
Chapter 9 - The Rationality of Pol Pot
from Part II - The Comparative Case Study
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2018
- Frontmatter
- Acknowledgements
- Contents
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I The Theory
- Part II The Comparative Case Study
- Chapter 7 Pol Pot and the Destruction of Cambodia
- Chapter 8 Milosevic and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
- Chapter 9 The Rationality of Pol Pot
- Chapter 10 The Rationality of Milosevic
- Chapter 11 Military Intervention: Lessons Learned from the Wars with NATO and Vietnam
- Chapter 12 Lessons Learned for the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect
- Chapter 13 Conclusion: A Piece of the Puzzle
- References
Summary
INTRODUCTION
That ideology played an important role in shaping the events in Cambodia seems beyond doubt. Many people suffered a horrendous death because of the imposition of policies that were meant to bring forth a communist utopian society. The real question is whether Pol Pot used this ideology instrumentally because it suited his personal goals and ambitions, or whether there was a genuine belief in the righteousness of the revolution that propelled these developments. Scholars differ somewhat of opinion on this manner. Some scholars are convinced a lust for power lay at the root of these atrocities while others belief it was the uncompromising commitment to the ideology that is to blame. Chindawongse, for instance, believes that power was Pol Pot's predominant overarching goal and that the desire to change society was only necessary and desirable to obtain and maintain control over the country (Chindawongse, 1991, p. 127). According to Chindawongse,
‘the Pol Pot leadership regarded ideology as an instrument of policy rather than an idealized blueprint of objective to be achieved. Its ultimate objective was to create conditions within the CPK and to restructure social and economic relationships in Cambodia to foster the achievement and perpetuation of a political power monopoly’ (1991, p. 132).
Jackson, on the other hand found that the most important motive for the elite was the desire to create an egalitarian society in combination with utter disgust for the old regime (K. D. Jackson, 1989, pp. 54-56). Chandler does not see how one option should negate the others and is convinced that it was a ‘courageous, doomed attempt by a group of utopian thinkers’, while at the same time it was also the result of an extreme ‘thirst for power’ (Chandler, 1999, p. 3).
Other scholars are not convinced a rational explanation for the violence can be found because, they argue, Pol Pot was crazy. Polin described Pol Pot as ‘a madman who takes himself for an avenging deity’ (Polin, 1980, p. 45). Valentino, on the other hand, sees Pol Pot's paranoid psychological mindset as being intimately linked to his ideological outlook. According to Valentino, the paranoia communist leaders often suffer from is attached to the extreme Marxist outlook that they have and should not be seen as solely something which stems from ‘their personal psychological aberrations’ (Valentino, 2004, p. 100).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Rationality of DictatorsTowards a more effective implementation of the responsibility to protect, pp. 241 - 274Publisher: IntersentiaPrint publication year: 2016