Voting Rules: A Constitutional Quandary

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511510519.010

10 - Voting Rules: A Constitutional Quandary

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009

Edited by

Pierre Salmon and

Gianluigi Galeotti: Affiliation:
Università di Roma, La Sapienza
Albert Breton: Affiliation:
University of Toronto
Gianluigi Galeotti: Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Roma 'La Sapienza', Italy
Pierre Salmon: Affiliation:
Université de Bourgogne, France
Ronald Wintrobe: Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario

Book contents

Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION: STABILITY AND CHANGE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Civic and economic freedoms depend on the competitiveness of a political system, a competitiveness fostered by the constitutional division of powers, the rule of law, and the contestability of the elective positions. Regarding the last issue, this chapter deals with the citizens or representative relationship and moves from the factual remark that the rules governing the appointment of the members of legislative assemblies are not sanctioned in any contemporary constitution. Leaving the framing of people's consent to statutory laws amounts to entrusting the regulation of political competition to the very ones who should be regulated. Notwithstanding the whims of partisan politics, however, those rules prove to be remarkably stable. Hence a first question, why so much stability? If we agree with Roger Myerson (1999) that political leaders meeting and negotiating in the halls of government cannot be exempt from Adam Smith's remark on the risk of conspiracies against the public, we face a subtler question: Is any trick behind that stability, often accompanied by apparently minor innovations consented to by incumbent representatives?

As often occurs, it is the subtler question to have attracted scholars' attention when discussing political opportunism. The first question, however, remains unasked and political economists resort to assuming, explicitly or implicitly, the constitutional status of electoral rules (see, e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Mueller, 1996). A weak assumption indeed in a relationship where it is the agent more than the principal who has the whip-hand.

Type: Chapter
Information: Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics , pp. 177 - 197

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510519.010 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acemoglu, , Daron, , and James, Robinson, 2000, “Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 1167–1199CrossRef Google Scholar

Alghion, , Philippe, , and Jean, Tirole, 1997, “Formal and real authority in organization,”Journal of Political Economy 105, 1–29CrossRef Google Scholar

Barro, , Robert, , 1973, “The control of politicians: an economic model,”Public Choice 14, 19–42CrossRef Google Scholar

Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair, 1990, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885–1985, Cambridge University Press

Berg, , Jooyce, , John, Dickhaut, and Kevin, McCabe, 1995, “Trust, reciprocity and social history,”Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–142CrossRef Google Scholar

Blaustein, Albert P., and Gispert H. Flanz, 1984 (and successive updating), Constitutions of the Countries of the World, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc

Boix, , Charles, , 1999, “Setting the Rules of the Game: the Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies,”American Political Science Review 93, 604–624CrossRef Google Scholar

Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loren Lomasky, 1993, Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference, New York: Cambridge University Press

Breton, Albert, 1996, Competitive Governments, New York: Cambridge University Press

Breton, , Albert, , and Gianluigi, Galeotti, 1985, “Is proportional representation always the best electoral rule?,”Public Finance – Finance Publique 40, 1–16Google Scholar

Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock, 1962, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press

Buruma, , Ian, , 2001, “The Japanese Berlusconi?,”New York Review of Books 48 (12), 42–44Google Scholar

Calvert, Randall, 1995, “The rational choice theory of social institutions: Cooperation, coordination and communication,” in Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek (eds.), Modern Political Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 216–267

Congleton, , Roger, , 1984, “Committees and rent-seeking effort,”Journal of Public Economics 25, 197–209CrossRef Google Scholar

Cooter, Robert, and Thomas Ulen, 1998, Law and Economics, Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company

Cox, , Gary, , and Jonathan, Katz, 1999, “The reapportionement revolution and bias in U.S. Congressinal elections,”The American Journal of Political Science 34, 903–935CrossRef Google Scholar

Dick, A., and Lott, J., 1993, “Reconciling voters' behavior with legislative term limits,”Journal of Public Economics 50, 1–14CrossRef Google Scholar

Downs, Anthony, 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row

Edlin, , Aaron, , and Joseph, Stiglitz, 1995, “Discouraging rivals: Managerial rent-seeking and economic inefficiencies,”American Economic Review 85, 1301–1312Google Scholar

Eggertsson, , Thrainn, , 1995, “On the Economics of Economics,”Kyklos 48, 201–210CrossRef Google Scholar

Finer, S. E., 1997, The History of Government from the Earliest Time, New York: Oxford University Press

Friedman, , Daniel, , and Donald, Wittman, 1995, “Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation,”Journal of Public Economics 57, 67–83CrossRef Google Scholar

Galeotti, , Gianluigi, , 1994, “On proportional non-representation,”Public Choice 80, 359–370CrossRef Google Scholar

Galeotti, Gianluigi, 2000, “Founding fathers vs. rotten kids: A positive approach to constitutional politics,” in G. Galeotti, P. Salmon and R. Wintrobe (eds.), Competition and Structure: The Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in Honor of Albert Breton, New York: Cambridge University Press, 104–125

Galeotti, , Gianluigi, , and Albert, Breton, 1986, “An economic theory of political parties,”Kyklos 39, 47–65CrossRef Google Scholar

Gelman, , Andrew, , and Gary, King, 1994, “Enhancing democracy through legislative redistricting,”The American Political Science Review 88, 541–559CrossRef Google Scholar

Gopoian, , David, , and Darrell, West, 1984, “Trading security for seats: Strategic considerations in the redistricting process,”The Journal of Politics 46, 1080–1096CrossRef Google Scholar

Grillo, Michele, 1997, “Democracy, competition and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract, in A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R. Wintrobe (eds.), Understanding Democracy: Economic and Political Perspectives, New York: Cambridge University Press, 47– 63

Grofman, Bernard (ed.), 1996, Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives, Dordrecht: Kluwer Nijhoff

Hardin, Russell, 1989, “Why a constitution?” in B. Grofman and D. Wittman (eds.), The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, Agathon Press, 100–123

Kreps, David, 1990, “Corporate culture and economic theory,” in J. Alt and K. Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Political Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 90–143

Kishlansky, Mark A., 1986, Parliamentary Selection: Social and Political Choices in Early Modern England, New York: Cambridge University Press

McKelvey, , Richard, , and Peter, Ordeshook, 1985, “Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectation model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources,”The Journal of Economic Theory 36, 55–85CrossRef Google Scholar

McNutt, Patrick, 1997, “Rent-seeking and political tenure: First estimates,”Public Choice 92, 369–385CrossRef Google Scholar

Mueller, Dennis C., 1988, Public Choice II, New York: Cambridge University Press

Mueller, Dennis C., 1996, Constitutional Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Myerson, , Roger, B., 1999, “Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems,”European Economic Review 43, 671–697CrossRef Google Scholar

Niemi, , Richard, , and Laura, Winsky, 1992, “The persistence of partisan redistricting effects in Congressional elections in the 1970s and 1980s,”The Journal of Politics 54, 565–572CrossRef Google Scholar

Ordeshook, , Peter, C., 1992, “Constitutional stability,”Constitutional Political Economy 3, 137–175CrossRef Google Scholar

Ostidiek, , Donald, , 1995, “Congressional redistricting and district typology,”The Journal of Politics 57, 533–543CrossRef Google Scholar

Palfrey, , Tomas, , and Howard, Rosenthal, 1985, “Voter participation and strategic uncertainty,”American Political Science Review 79, 62–78CrossRef Google Scholar

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 2000, Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press

Powell, G. B., 1981, “Party systems and political systems performance,”The American Political Science Review 75, 861–879CrossRef Google Scholar

Riker, , William, , and Peter, Ordeshook, 1968, “A theory of the calculus of voting,”American Political Science Review 1968, 25–42CrossRef Google Scholar

Rokkan, S., 1970, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Process of Development, Oslo: Univeristetdforlaget

Shleifer, , Andrei, , and Robert, Wishny, 1989, “Management entrenchment,”Journal of Financial Economics 25, 123–139CrossRef Google Scholar

Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart, 1989, Seats and Votes, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

Theil, , Henry, , 1969, “The desired level of political entropy,”The American Political Science Review 63, 521–525CrossRef Google Scholar

Weingast, , Barry, , and William, Marshall, 1988, “The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets,”Journal of Political Economy 96, 132–163CrossRef Google Scholar

Wintrobe, , Ronald, , 1987, “The market for corporate control and the market for political control,”Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3, 435–448Google Scholar

Wintrobe, Ronald, 1998, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, New York: Cambridge University Press

Wittman, Donald, 1995, The Myth of Democratic Failure, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Wohlgemuth, , Michael, , 1999, “Entry barriers in politics; or, why politics, like natural monopoly, is not organized as an ongoing market process,”Review of Austrian Economics 12, 175–200CrossRef Google Scholar

Book contents

10 - Voting Rules: A Constitutional Quandary

Summary

Access options

References

Save book to Kindle

Save book to Dropbox

Save book to Google Drive