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13 - Détente and Defeat: Nixon, Ford, and Vietnam, 1969–1977

from Part II - From Great Power to Superpower

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 January 2024

Donald Stoker
Affiliation:
National Defense University, Washington, DC
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Summary

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger believed they could remake the international order in American interests to achieve greater international stability and reduce American costs and commitments. This required bringing China out of its isolation, which was an international bombshell. Under the Nixon Doctrine, the US would maintain its relationships but now bear less of the burden. Nixon and Kissinger used “linkage” to resolve issues with the Soviet Union and launched détente with Moscow. Moscow did what it wanted. Middle East involvement intensified, particularly with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Nixon wanted out of Vietnam but did not want to abandon South Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger tried to push Hanoi to its breaking point while negotiating America’s exit and drawing down. This was contradictory. Creighton Abrams ran the US war. He was ordered to abandon attrition but continued “search and destroy” operations and pacification. Vietnamization – turning the war over to South Vietnam – became a key strategy element. The US bombed and invaded the North’s sanctuary in Cambodia, backed a South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, helped thwart North Vietnam’s 1972 Easter Offensive into South Vietnam, partially via LINEBACKER, and coerced North Vietnam into signing a 1973 US withdrawal agreement via LINEBACKER II. The North conquered the South in 1975. Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon.

Keywords

Type
Chapter
Information
Purpose and Power
US Grand Strategy from the Revolutionary Era to the Present
, pp. 446 - 476
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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