Political philosophers have advocated a wide range of interpretations of justice: from the extreme libertarian to the extreme egalitarian to various compromise or value pluralism positions (e.g., Ackerman, 1980; Barry, 1989; Buchanan, 1975; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971; Walzer, 1983). The prescriptive conclusions these writers reach often depend on the psychological assumptions from which they start. Rawls (1971), for example, sees the just society as one in which the maximin principle (maximize the living standards of the worst off) guides policy – as long as this egalitarian objective does not violate the essential liberty of individuals. He arrives at this conclusion by arguing that people in the hypothetical “original position” (in which they know nothing about themselves or their future life prospects) would be extremely risk averse and would agree to enter into any social contract only if they were sure that society was committed to the maximin principle. People, in this view, want to be absolutely certain that they are not assigned to the bottom rung of a social order that is indifferent or hostile toward their fate. By contrast, Nozick (1974) sees the just society as a libertarian one in which the powers of the state are limited largely to protecting individual rights and enforcing contracts. He arrives at this conclusion by positing the primacy of Lockean property rights and personal freedom – self-evident truths, to paraphrase the authors of the U.S. Constitution.