Preman, a colloquial term for a thug or gangster, is synonymous in the minds of many Indonesians with some of the worst aspects of the country' political culture: intimidation, coercion, extortion and violence. This equation of preman with political thuggery developed during the New Order period (1966–98), during which gangs, youths and local thugs were regularly subcontracted and mobilised to carry out violence on behalf of the interests of the state and political elites. This was done in return for various concessions, such as legal immunity for their underworld activities and in some cases entry into and advancement through the government and administrative hierarchy. The word preman itself finds its roots in this confluence of state power and criminality. But to what extent have the preman become political and politicised subjects themselves in the new democratic Indonesia and sought to pursue their own social, economic and political interests rather than those of their patrons or clients?

The preman are commonly defined by their use of violence and criminality, and come from a social and economic underclass of marginalised youth, slum dwellers and urban poor, what Davis (2004) has described as the growing informal proletariat. Since the demise of the New Order, a plethora of social organisations (organisasi masyarakat, or ormas) have emerged that draw much of their membership from this preman underclass, claiming to represent their interests and, by implication, those of other marginalised and ‘wounded’ urban communities. As during the New Order, these groups are often involved in racketeering and violent entrepreneurship, both as a service to supply a ready market for forms of intimidation and in the form of a coercive relationship imposed on their immediate communities. However, at the same time such preman groups are increasingly articulating their social and political demands, engaging in grassroots activism and self-organisation, and pursuing strategies for engagement with the formal political process. This chapter examines the tension between criminality and socio-political engagement by looking at the ways in which some preman groups have organised themselves politically and sought to benefit from the electoral process. It also reflects on what this tells us about the nature and dynamics of Indonesian democracy.