from Part I - The Permissibility of Blame
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 April 2022
Here I argue that both the desert-based and value-based desiderata for a normatively adequate account of reactive blame can be met. First, adopting a victim-centered approach highlights the importance of blame for appropriately valuing other persons, and reactive blame is the variety of blame uniquely suited to serve this function. Thus the value-based desiderata for a normatively adequate account of reactive blame can be met. I then offer two arguments for thinking that the desert-based desiderata can be met. The first is a parity of reasons argument. Given epistemically relevant similarities between the negative reactive attitudes and a privileged subset of our moral judgments, we ought to extend the same privileged status to beliefs about the objects of the negative reactive attitudes. The second argument appeals to a similarity between our emotional experiences and perceptual experiences. Attending to this relation suggests that we have good reason to think some of our emotional experiences – those constitutive of the negative reactive attitudes in particular – provide indirect evidence for the existence of moral reasons that would render their content correct. Thus we have at least some good reason for thinking that the desert-based desideratum for normatively adequate reactive blame can be met.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.