Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction: Radical probabilism (1991)
- 2 Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses (1956)
- 3 Probable knowledge (1968)
- 4 Probability and the art of judgment (1985)
- 5 Bayesianism with a human face (1983)
- 6 Alias Smith and Jones: The testimony of the senses (1987)
- 7 Conditioning, kinematics, and exchangeability (1988)
- 8 Preference among preferences (1974)
- 9 On interpersonal utility theory (1971)
- 10 Remarks on interpersonal utility theory (1974)
- 11 Mises redux (1977)
- 12 Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference (1969)
- 13 New foundations for Bayesian decision theory (1965)
- 14 Frameworks for preference (1974)
- 15 Axiomatizing the logic of decision (1978)
- 16 A note on the kinematics of preference (1977)
7 - Conditioning, kinematics, and exchangeability (1988)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction: Radical probabilism (1991)
- 2 Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses (1956)
- 3 Probable knowledge (1968)
- 4 Probability and the art of judgment (1985)
- 5 Bayesianism with a human face (1983)
- 6 Alias Smith and Jones: The testimony of the senses (1987)
- 7 Conditioning, kinematics, and exchangeability (1988)
- 8 Preference among preferences (1974)
- 9 On interpersonal utility theory (1971)
- 10 Remarks on interpersonal utility theory (1974)
- 11 Mises redux (1977)
- 12 Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference (1969)
- 13 New foundations for Bayesian decision theory (1965)
- 14 Frameworks for preference (1974)
- 15 Axiomatizing the logic of decision (1978)
- 16 A note on the kinematics of preference (1977)
Summary
PREVIEW
The change (“conditioning”) from prior P to posterior Q = P( | E) is appropriate only if it changes no probabilities conditionally on E. Under similar conditions a generalization of conditioning (“probability kinematics”) is appropriate when Q(E) < 1. That generalization is pretty nearly equivalent to ordinary conditioning on the extraordinary proposition that Q(E) has a certain value. Whether or not generalized conditioning is sensitive to the order in which successive changes are made depends on how the changes are set, e.g., by probabilities, or by ratios of probabilities. In a finitistic framework, simple and generalized (“partial”) exchangeability are characterized and related to probability kinematics.
CONDITIONING
Sometimes an experiment or observation is adequately represented by partitioning the sample space in such a way as to satisfy both of the following conditions.
(1) Certainty. Observing the outcome drives your probability for some cell E of the partitioning to 1.
(2) Sufficiency. Probabilities conditioned on E remain unchanged.
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- Probability and the Art of Judgment , pp. 117 - 153Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1992
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