Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Propositions and Corollaries
- Tables
- Figures
- Sidebars
- Definitions
- Preface
- Overview of the Book
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods
- Part I The Logic of Collective Action
- Part II Collective Choice
- Part III Political Institutions and Quality Outcomes
- Part IV Social Justice, Choice, and Welfare
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Part I - The Logic of Collective Action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Propositions and Corollaries
- Tables
- Figures
- Sidebars
- Definitions
- Preface
- Overview of the Book
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods
- Part I The Logic of Collective Action
- Part II Collective Choice
- Part III Political Institutions and Quality Outcomes
- Part IV Social Justice, Choice, and Welfare
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
The Logic of Collective Action
Politics grabs our attention under two circumstances. Politics is important when we share interests that are worth pursuing as a group but are too costly for any one individual or family to undertake alone. Politics also grabs our attention when politicians achieve things that are not in the people’s interests. We begin our examination of politics by analyzing the positive basis for politics grabbing our attention. Why are political institutions needed when the interests of a group surpass the means of any single individual?
Politics enables us to achieve together what we can’t achieve separately. This view enables us to connect the premises of rational choice with the political life we all observe. Mancur Olson brilliantly used this connection to fashion some of the firstmodels of collective action. He put the point clearly enough to catch political scientists’ attention. As Olson put it in the opening of his 1965 blockbuster, The Logic of Collective Action:
The idea that groups tend to act in support of their group interests is supposed to follow logically from this widely held premise of rational, self-interested behavior . . .. But it is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested behavior . . .. The notion that groups of individuals will act to achieve their common or group interests, far from being a logical implication of their individual interests, is in fact inconsistent with that assumption.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Principles of PoliticsA Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice, pp. 25 - 26Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012