Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Propositions and Corollaries
- Tables
- Figures
- Sidebars
- Definitions
- Preface
- Overview of the Book
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods
- Part I The Logic of Collective Action
- Part II Collective Choice
- Part III Political Institutions and Quality Outcomes
- Part IV Social Justice, Choice, and Welfare
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Part II - Collective Choice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Propositions and Corollaries
- Tables
- Figures
- Sidebars
- Definitions
- Preface
- Overview of the Book
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods
- Part I The Logic of Collective Action
- Part II Collective Choice
- Part III Political Institutions and Quality Outcomes
- Part IV Social Justice, Choice, and Welfare
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
Collective Choice
In Part I we examined how groups can overcome inherent difficulties involved in providing themselves with public goods. Another aspect of the problem was not discussed. Solving dilemmas to achieve shared goals usually requires collective choice: a centralized decision. Just because unanimous support for some collective solution should always be possible, as all observers of politics have witnessed, rarely is collective choice of any sort – much less by unanimity – easy to come by. Frequently more is needed than making sure the group is organized to collect and apply resources needed to carry out collective projects. Collective, binding decisions are required regarding what is to be done. This process is anything but simple. Some of the roadblocks that make for these difficulties are analyzed in this (and the next) part of this volume.
We humans have a long and difficult history of trying to engineer “good” political systems to reach collective choices. We have ruled ourselves with various sorts of regimes, which we might divide into two overly broad classes: authoritarian and democratic. And here, in spite of the contemporary Western bias to democracy, looking at the landscape of political history, one notices that people have prospered under a variety of regimes. Civilization did not require democracy. But it did require an element of decent government. Since a degree of general prosperity is needed for the leaders, even the rare Stalins and Caligulas of the world have to consider constraints to their behavior in order to bolster the welfare of their citizens. Although, in most situations, the fate of governments is at least loosely tied to the interests of the citizenry, the requirements of prosperity seem quite constraining. In modern times the attempt to tether governments to the interests of the citizens has been intimately related to the establishment and design of democratic governments. Much of this effort has proven successful. Modern democracies have had quite a track record at improving the conditions of their citizens. In this section of the book, I explore some properties of democratic governments that help us understand their potential, and their difficulties.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Principles of PoliticsA Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice, pp. 91 - 94Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012