Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Ethnic Constituencies in the Market for Votes
- 3 Communal Politics in Lebanon
- 4 Communal Politics in Yemen
- 5 Contemporary Clientelism
- 6 Captive Audiences and Public Services
- 7 Intermingled Vote Markets
- 8 Perverse Competition and Personalized Patronage
- 9 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
4 - Communal Politics in Yemen
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Ethnic Constituencies in the Market for Votes
- 3 Communal Politics in Lebanon
- 4 Communal Politics in Yemen
- 5 Contemporary Clientelism
- 6 Captive Audiences and Public Services
- 7 Intermingled Vote Markets
- 8 Perverse Competition and Personalized Patronage
- 9 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Summary
INTRODUCTION
As the previous chapter demonstrated, Lebanon's communal constituencies vary considerably in the degree to which they are internally competitive: elites compete vigorously for political support in some communities, but are sheltered from competition in others. As one would expect, Yemen's communal groups evolved in a different historical, institutional, and demographic context from their counterparts in Lebanon. Although the contextual details differ between the two societies, they have experienced similar patterns in the development of their communal constituencies: political competition inside some of them, but not in others.
Lebanon's communal divisions are not absolute, of course, and Yemen's are also more contingent than simple dichotomies would imply. Partially overlapping cleavages based on tribe, sect, and region suffuse Yemeni society, with different people placing differing degrees of weight on each element. Political contestation has exacerbated these divisions since the 1990 unification of the northern and southern republics, however. In particular, the ruling party and opposition compete – albeit on an uneven playing field – for supporters within the less tribalized Sunni communities of the midland and southern provinces that constitute the country's demographic majority. Over time, however, Zaydi tribesmen gravitated to the ruling party in response to the push of Salafi assertiveness in the Sunni community and, more importantly, the pull of patronage payoffs to their shaykhs. Hence, the ruling regime progressively established its ascendency over the tribes in the Zaydi community – a dominance eventually ruptured by the shock of the Arab Spring and the opportunistic defection of key allies among the tribes.
This chapter runs roughly in parallel to the previous one, which examined the evolution of competition within Lebanon's sectarian communities. Here, I trace how Yemen arrived at a point where competition differed substantially within its Sunni and Zaydi constituencies. The chapter begins with an overview of governance in Yemen pre- and post-unification, focusing on the collusive bargain between the northern and southern ruling parties that ultimately ended in a civil war from which the northern ruling regime emerged victorious.Whereas the Lebanese civil war created a political vacuum in that country's Sunni community, the Yemeni civil war disrupted the balance of power among the Yemeni political parties and enabled the ruling party to consolidate its authority at the expense of its erstwhile partners by poaching the latters’ supporters.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Price of a Vote in the Middle EastClientelism and Communal Politics in Lebanon and Yemen, pp. 90 - 118Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016