Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Ethnic Constituencies in the Market for Votes
- 3 Communal Politics in Lebanon
- 4 Communal Politics in Yemen
- 5 Contemporary Clientelism
- 6 Captive Audiences and Public Services
- 7 Intermingled Vote Markets
- 8 Perverse Competition and Personalized Patronage
- 9 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
6 - Captive Audiences and Public Services
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Ethnic Constituencies in the Market for Votes
- 3 Communal Politics in Lebanon
- 4 Communal Politics in Yemen
- 5 Contemporary Clientelism
- 6 Captive Audiences and Public Services
- 7 Intermingled Vote Markets
- 8 Perverse Competition and Personalized Patronage
- 9 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Summary
INTRODUCTION
People throughout the world expect their governments to provide citizens with basic services and infrastructure such as schools, roads, electricity, and water. In many developing societies, however, this expectation is more aspirational than it is anticipated. Instead, demand for these services often outstrips supply – in some places by a little, and others by a lot. Simple, day-to-day activities that people in wealthy societies perform without thinking – flipping on a light switch, turning on a kitchen tap – cannot be taken for granted in much of the developing world.
Political cartoons, both in the independent and party newspapers, often illustrate this all-too-common frustration with a burning candle (“electricity in our country”) – suggesting that the government is not serving anyone particularly well. They make no mention, of course, why the electricity services are so poor: perhaps it is due to bureaucratic incompetence, or a simple scarcity of resources. We might dig deeper, however, to see whether or not there is some variation in how those scarce resources get targeted: who makes out modestly better than their peers, and who can expect particularly poor service.
At the beginning of this book, I quoted several elites who complained about the neglect their communities faced from states run by members of their own communities. In Lebanon, a local notable in a Sunni city wanted to know why electricity and water services were so spotty, and why all clinics and schools previously promised to the city had not materialized. In Yemen, tribal shaykhs wanted to know why the state was not running roads out to tribal lands, building schools and clinics there, establishing irrigation projects, or even digging wells for clean drinking water. In both cases, key constituencies – those ostensibly helping to keep their elites in power – were seeing little in return for their political support.
Is there any substance to these complaints? One must be cautious about relying too heavily on elite quotations, of course: they may be inaccurate or selfserving. First, the complaints may reflect rhetoric rather than reality. Second, they may not be based on particularly well-informed reference points.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Price of a Vote in the Middle EastClientelism and Communal Politics in Lebanon and Yemen, pp. 156 - 174Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016