Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-29T02:04:47.029Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Appendix A - Electoral rules for one-seat districts and coalition-building incentives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Matthew Soberg Shugart
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
John M. Carey
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Get access

Summary

We saw in Chapter 10 that in Costa Rica, the rule requiring a candidate to obtain at least 40% of the vote or else face a runoff has led to a pattern of competition almost identical to that seen in straight plurality presidential systems. The Costa Rican rule thus contrasts rather starkly with majority provisions, in which there is a runoff in the event that no candidate obtains at least 50% plus one of the votes. In such majority runoff systems, the vote shares of the first and second finishers in the first round tend to be considerably lower than in plurality rules, including the Costa Rican variant.

Is this outcome fortuitous, or is there something to the 40% rule that encourages broad preelection coalitions as does pure plurality? This question is worth investigating, especially given that there is only one case of a system using the 40% rule. Perhaps Costa Rica, where a runoff has never been required, is a special case because of its single well-organized mass party, the Party of National Liberation (PLN). Perhaps this party has a “natural” share of the vote that approximates 50% anyway. If so, it might ordinarily win elections (which it certainly does), and it could only lose to a united opposition – that is, one that could itself approach the magical 50% mark. Indeed, in six of the ten elections since 1958, the PLN has obtained an absolute majority.

Type
Chapter
Information
Presidents and Assemblies
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics
, pp. 288 - 292
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×