(26.) The first thing impressed on us from our earliest infancy is, that events do not succeed one another at random, but with a certain degree of order, regularity, and connection; — some constantly, and, as we are apt to think, immutably, — as the alternation of day and night, summer and winter, — others contingently, as the motion of a body from its place, if pushed, or the burning of a stick if thrust into the fire. The knowledge that the former class of events has gone on, uninterruptedly, for ages beyond all memory, impresses us with a strong expectation that it will continue to do so in the same manner; and thus our notion of an order of nature is originated and confirmed. If every thing were equally regular and periodical, and the succession of events liable to no change depending on our own will, it may be doubted whether we should ever think of looking for causes. No one regards the night as the cause of the day, or the day of night. They are alternate effects of a common cause, which their regular succession alone gives us no sufficient clue for determining. It is chiefly, perhaps entirely, from the other or contingent class of events that we gain our notions of cause and effect. From them alone we gather that there are such things as laws of nature.