The Soviet Union's drive towards securing full recognition in Europe in the mid-1920s found its fullest expression in relations with Britain. During these years, the course of Anglo-Soviet relations, besides providing the criterion for the success of Soviet foreign policy, registered a vital impact on the general outlook of the Soviet Union. It reflected the gradual subordination of revolutionary proselytization to the more pressing need for acceptance on an equal footing by the Western nations. The transition, combined with a measure of success in reintegration into Europe, had far-reaching consequences in the domestic domain. In comparison relations with Russia had a marginal effect on Britain, whose main problem lay in communicating with a state which conformed to no existing category and appeared to pursue an unconventional foreign policy in defiance of international codes of behaviour. ‘There are notoriously no precedents’, complained Gregory, probably the leading authority on Russia in the Foreign Office, ‘for dealing with a regime – one can hardly say a country – like the Soviets.’

The enmity which marked these relations was on the whole not a continuation of the historical feud between Britain and Russia; this largely vanished when Curzon relinquished his post as Foreign Secretary at the end of 1923. The roots of the post-war friction lay in antagonism towards the perplexing new regime committed to crushing the world social order, and the failure to adopt an adequate policy towards it. Prior to recognition the dilemma was not yet acute.