Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- Preface
- Introduction: Striving for acceptance
- 1 Soviet Russia and the first Labour Government
- 2 The policy of doing nothing
- 3 The Anglo-Soviet trade union alliance: an uneasy partnership
- 4 Russia and the general strike
- 5 Attempts to heal the breach
- 6 The rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Attempts to heal the breach
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 June 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- Preface
- Introduction: Striving for acceptance
- 1 Soviet Russia and the first Labour Government
- 2 The policy of doing nothing
- 3 The Anglo-Soviet trade union alliance: an uneasy partnership
- 4 Russia and the general strike
- 5 Attempts to heal the breach
- 6 The rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Krasin's mission to Britain
The Russians, increasingly aware of the strain which the general strike had contributed to the deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations, resorted to two major strategies in pursuing their policy of conciliation. In order to stabilize relations they concentrated their efforts on winning over the City and commercial circles, thereby exerting considerable pressure on the British Government to resist the emotional calls of the diehards to sever relations. Simultaneously, steps were taken to restore the solidarity movement between the trade unions of the two countries to thwart possible aggression by the British Government. The emphasis initially laid on formal diplomatic efforts was gradually transferred to the defensive measures when it was realized that the general strike had inflicted irreparable damage on Anglo-Soviet relations. The diplomatic nature of the trade union alliance was particularly evident in view of the radicalization of Comintern's politics in Britain after the strike and the subsequent distinction between the tasks assigned to the trade unions and those of the communist organs.
When Chamberlain met Rosengoltz on 13 July, he left the Russians very little room for interpretation of the future British policy towards Russia. He certainly gave them no grounds for illusions of an improvement in relations. Chamberlain faithfully reflected the feeling in Cabinet when he told Rosengoltz that the ‘gulf of principles’ separating the two countries was ‘unbridgeable’. The conditions he laid down for renewed negotiations were clearly calculated to forestall any positive move by the Russians: they were called upon to comply with their undertaking to refrain from propaganda, to fully compensate former private owners of business in Russia, and to pay their war debts.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Precarious TruceAnglo-Soviet Relations 1924–27, pp. 180 - 210Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1977