Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reason

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511616402.011

10 - Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009

Peter Baumann

Edited by

Peter Baumann and

Monika Betzler

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Peter Baumann: Affiliation:
Lecturer of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, UK
Peter Baumann: Affiliation:
University of Aberdeen
Monika Betzler: Affiliation:
Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany

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Summary

If the world were perfect, it wouldn't be.

Yogi Berra

I am going to present what I think is an interesting paradox. I will first give an exposition of the paradox (which could be called a “preface paradox for goals” – for reasons that will become obvious soon). I will then deal with some objections and finally discuss a proposed solution to the paradox.

THE PARADOX

A good starting point is, as always, a triviality: Agents want their goals to be realized. More precisely:

(1) If an agent A has a goal G, then A wants that G will be realized (by A or somebody or something else).

This has to be taken in the de dicto-sense – hence not in the de re-sense of “something would constitute the goal's realization, and A wants it.” I use “A wants that p” in the strong sense of “All things considered, A prefers the truth of ‘p’ to the truth of ‘not-p.’”

Having a particular desire is, of course, compatible with not wanting its realization. Goals, however, are different: They imply the desiredness of their realization. It is simply incoherent to say something like, “I have this goal but I do not want to realize it.”

The following thing seems trivial also:

(2) Agents have many goals (at any particular time as well as throughout their lives).

As does this:

(3) If an agent A has a finite number of goals G1, G2, …, Gn, then A wants that G1 will be realized, A wants that G2 will be realized, …, A wants that Gn will be realized.
[…]

Type: Chapter
Information: Practical Conflicts
New Philosophical Essays
, pp. 244 - 261

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616402.011 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2004

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References

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