Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili provides a two-part illustration in which initial success in concealing its quasi-authoritarian rule from the US’s Millennium Challenge Corporation might have been, but ultimately was not, repurposed into success with its most important audiences: the European Union and NATO. Georgia after the Rose Revolution was just illegible enough for the Americans, given their strong asymmetrically interdependent relationship with the new regime, even though Saakashvili’s government had increased legibility by consolidating corruption into his inner circle’s hands. This was not enough for the EU or NATO, even though each has found reasons to overlook domestic insufficiencies before and, according to some members, the Russian threat prior to the August War of 2008 demanded rather than prevented Georgian accession. Georgia had the same mid-level legibility as it showed the Americans, but it faced a deeply divided audience in the other organizations. With no agreement on what Georgia meant for either organization, an asymmetrically interdependent relationship did not coalesce, and Georgia did not manage to conceal its quasi-authoritarian domestic rule from either one.