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7 - Reporting Matters

Performance Indicators and Compliance in the International Labor Organization (ILO)

from Part II - The Normative Influence of Ratings and Rankings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2020

By
Faradj Koliev ,
Thomas Sommerer  and
Jonas Tallberg
Edited by
Judith G. Kelley  and
Beth A. Simmons
Judith G. Kelley
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Beth A. Simmons
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

While recent decades have witnessed a rise in the use and forms of Global Performance Indicators (GPIs), there is little systematic evidence on their effects. In this article, we address the effects of GPIs through a specific focus on international organizations’ (IOs) reporting on state compliance with international rules. We focus on the International Labour Organization (ILO), which offers a unique case for evaluating the impact of performance indicators in the absence of enforcement. We develop an argument for why reporting by IOs should lead states to correct non-compliant behavior, and when those effects should be particularly strong. Our principal findings are three-fold. First, ILO reporting has significant and durable effects on state respect for labor rights, especially in addressing severe cases of non-compliance. Second, reporting affects state behavior quite immediately, but can also lead to improvements when repeated over longer periods of time. Third, reporting has stronger effects on improvements in labor rights when the target states are democratic and have the resource capacity to correct violations. These findings have important implications for our understanding of GPIs and the effect of IO reporting on state compliance.

Keywords

Labor RightsInternational Labour OrganizationGPIsInternational Organizationshuman rights
Type
Chapter
Information
The Power of Global Performance Indicators , pp. 203 - 241
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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