Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Harvard Environmental Economics Program, International Advisory Board
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Faculty Steering Committee
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Project Management
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Alternative international policy architectures
- 2 An elaborated proposal for a global climate policy architecture: specific formulas and emission targets for all countries in all decades
- 3 The EU emission trading scheme: a prototype global system?
- 4 Linkage of tradable permit systems in international climate policy architecture
- 5 The case for charges on greenhouse gas emissions
- 6 Towards a global compact for managing climate change
- 7 Sectoral approaches to a post-Kyoto international climate policy framework
- 8 A portfolio system of climate treaties
- Part II Negotiation, assessment, and compliance
- Part III The role and means of technology transfer
- Part IV Global climate policy and international trade
- Part V Economic development, adaptation, and deforestation
- Part VI Modeling impacts of alternative allocations of responsibility
- Part VII Synthesis and conclusion
- Appendix A Selected List of Individuals Consulted, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Appendix B Workshops and Conferences, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Index
8 - A portfolio system of climate treaties
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Harvard Environmental Economics Program, International Advisory Board
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Faculty Steering Committee
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Project Management
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Alternative international policy architectures
- 2 An elaborated proposal for a global climate policy architecture: specific formulas and emission targets for all countries in all decades
- 3 The EU emission trading scheme: a prototype global system?
- 4 Linkage of tradable permit systems in international climate policy architecture
- 5 The case for charges on greenhouse gas emissions
- 6 Towards a global compact for managing climate change
- 7 Sectoral approaches to a post-Kyoto international climate policy framework
- 8 A portfolio system of climate treaties
- Part II Negotiation, assessment, and compliance
- Part III The role and means of technology transfer
- Part IV Global climate policy and international trade
- Part V Economic development, adaptation, and deforestation
- Part VI Modeling impacts of alternative allocations of responsibility
- Part VII Synthesis and conclusion
- Appendix A Selected List of Individuals Consulted, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Appendix B Workshops and Conferences, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Climate change is so fundamental a challenge that it may be best addressed from a multiple of perspectives, using a multiple of approaches.
This is a radically different concept from the arrangement developed thus far. Under the Kyoto Protocol, emission reduction obligations apply to entire economies, not to individual sectors; reforestation (which sequesters and therefore removes carbon dioxide or CO2 from the atmosphere) is allowed to substitute for abatement (which reduces greenhouse gas [GHG] additions to the atmosphere, relative to “business as usual”); the emissions of different countries can be traded; and increases in the emission of one gas can be offset by reductions in the emission of another. This approach has one great virtue: it promotes cost-effective abatement.
Unfortunately, this approach has also (so far, at least) failed to address the more important objective, which is to reduce GHG emissions and ultimately to stabilize atmospheric concentrations. There may be different explanations for this. My diagnosis is that this failure is due to a lack of robust enforcement. So, why not add an enforcement capability? As I shall explain in this chapter, it may not be possible to enforce the current treaty design. If enforcement is important—and I shall argue here that it is essential—then a better strategy may be to break up the problem, treating different sources and types of gases separately. This strategy may succeed better at reducing emissions overall.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Post-Kyoto International Climate PolicyImplementing Architectures for Agreement, pp. 240 - 270Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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