Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Harvard Environmental Economics Program, International Advisory Board
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Faculty Steering Committee
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Project Management
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Alternative international policy architectures
- Part II Negotiation, assessment, and compliance
- Part III The role and means of technology transfer
- Part IV Global climate policy and international trade
- Part V Economic development, adaptation, and deforestation
- 18 Reconciling human development and climate protection: a multistage hybrid climate policy architecture
- 19 What do we expect from an international climate agreement? A perspective from a low-income country
- 20 Climate accession deals: new strategies for taming growth of greenhouse gases in developing countries
- 21 Policies for developing country engagement
- 22 International forest carbon sequestration in a post-Kyoto agreement
- Part VI Modeling impacts of alternative allocations of responsibility
- Part VII Synthesis and conclusion
- Appendix A Selected List of Individuals Consulted, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Appendix B Workshops and Conferences, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Index
20 - Climate accession deals: new strategies for taming growth of greenhouse gases in developing countries
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Harvard Environmental Economics Program, International Advisory Board
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Faculty Steering Committee
- Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Project Management
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Alternative international policy architectures
- Part II Negotiation, assessment, and compliance
- Part III The role and means of technology transfer
- Part IV Global climate policy and international trade
- Part V Economic development, adaptation, and deforestation
- 18 Reconciling human development and climate protection: a multistage hybrid climate policy architecture
- 19 What do we expect from an international climate agreement? A perspective from a low-income country
- 20 Climate accession deals: new strategies for taming growth of greenhouse gases in developing countries
- 21 Policies for developing country engagement
- 22 International forest carbon sequestration in a post-Kyoto agreement
- Part VI Modeling impacts of alternative allocations of responsibility
- Part VII Synthesis and conclusion
- Appendix A Selected List of Individuals Consulted, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Appendix B Workshops and Conferences, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Index
Summary
Effective strategies for managing the dangers of global climate change are essential yet difficult to design and implement. One of the greatest difficulties is in devising a policy that will engage developing countries in the global effort. Those nations, so far, have been nearly universal in their refusal to make credible commitments to reduce growth in their emissions of greenhouse gases. Most put a higher priority on economic growth—even at the expense of distant, global environmental goods. And most have little administrative ability to control emissions in many sectors of their economy. Even if they adopted policies to control emissions it is not clear that firms and other actors within their countries would follow. To be successful, a strategy for engaging developing countries must create stronger incentives for these countries to adjust their development patterns while also fixing (or navigating around) the administrative barriers that would make it difficult for these governments to honor international commitments.
Such problems are hardly new in international affairs. Diplomats have considerable experience designing instruments to address situations where countries have little interest in cooperation or are unable to implement their commitments. Those instruments have included sticks (e.g., trade sanctions) and carrots (e.g., subsidies for projects that reduce emissions and for administrative capacity building). So far, however, the sticks and carrots that have been mobilized in the area of climate change have not had much impact on investment and behavior in developing countries. All the sticks that have been considered are costly to deploy in the real world. Trade sanctions and border tariffs, for example, have been widely discussed and included in some draft legislation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Post-Kyoto International Climate PolicyImplementing Architectures for Agreement, pp. 618 - 648Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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