In the previous chapter, I provided systematic statistical support for a central implication of the theory presented in Chapter 2. This implication focuses on the fact that if the potential to lose public support for evasion represents a key enforcement mechanism for judicial decisions, the Bundesverfassungsgericht will be more aggressive in using its veto powers the more transparent its political environment is. The evidence was overwhelmingly consistent with this prediction. The court is considerably more likely to annul legislation when public awareness of a case is high, when the court enjoys outside political support for an annulment, and when the issue involved is noncomplex and easy to police. Although critical, this relationship between transparency and judicial deference constitutes only on aspect of the theoretical argument. In this chapter, we explore other implications of the theory. Before I outline these implications, a few remarks about the approach taken in this chapter are useful.

Methodologically, we change tracks in this chapter. Instead of analyzing data statistically, we will consider qualitative evidence – specifically, interviews with judges of the FCC and members of the Bundestag. What makes such qualitative evidence particularly relevant? Rational choice theories (like the one presented here) posit that actors are conscious decision makers who act in ways that they believe will maximize their welfare as they perceive it. In other words, the subjective perceptions of the actors whose behavior is being explained constitute a crucial ingredient in rational choice approaches.