Just how do rulers govern in these circumstances? We have already considered some common strategies to use or neutralize ethnicity and build the economic power of the politically powerful. But governing is a more complex process than this: rulers must motivate bureaucrats to implement laws and policies and citizens to act in accordance with authoritative decisions. How can a governing elite obtain this double compliance in weakly integrated, poverty-stricken peasant societies?

A strong state is one that can count on willing compliance. All rulers desire legitimacy – the conviction among bureaucrats and citizens that they are under an obligation to obey those occupying certain authority-positions. Relatively few governments, however, achieve a firm moral basis for their rule. If legitimacy is fragile, willing compliance must derive from pragmatic considerations. People consent because they believe that a particular government or policy advances their interests. This explains why a ruler surreptitiously favours a strategic region or tribe; he hopes to gain generalized support amongst that group. Beyond that, he buys instrumental allegiance from influential individuals and groups through patronage. Yet, the greater a regime's dependence upon mercenary support, the greater is its vulnerability to disaffection in the event of an economic downturn.

The other basis for rule is, of course, coerced compliance. All governments, to be sure, depend from time to time on some form of coercion; the application of this may fall to the courts, the army, the police or the prisons.