2.1 Introduction
Sustainability transformations and societal decarbonization have become key political challenges across all levels and sectors around the world. The challenge to decarbonize societies is amplified by multiple and often interrelated crises such as the war in Ukraine, energy security, biodiversity loss, the pandemic, and economic recessions. The rate of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions is far too slow to achieve the Paris Agreement’s targets of 1.5°C and 2°C and prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change, as indicated in the IPCC’s (2023) synthesis report. The dire warnings of several IPCC reports are amplified by the increased frequency of extreme weather events worldwide. As a result, researchers, environmental activists, and other societal actors are increasingly calling for the urgent, radical, and far-reaching decarbonization of societies and economies. Green industrialization, circular economy, low-carbon economy, de-growth or post-growth economy, transition towns, Green Deals in the EU and the USA, and the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals reflect an increased focus on challenges associated with deep decarbonization (Reference Jordan, Lorenzoni and TosunJordan et al., 2022). In this chapter, we approach these challenges to govern large-scale societal transformations to achieve a fossil-free, climate-neutral, decarbonized, low-carbon, or net-zero society. More specifically, we develop an analytical framework to understand decarbonization by capturing the multiple and complex relations between the state and non-state actors in what we frame as collaborative governance (see Section 2.3 ).
Despite the urgency, scale, and gravity of the climate crisis, we observe a trend toward soft and voluntary steering and “governance through goals” in climate and sustainability governance. The 2030 Agenda and the “pledge and review” approach of the Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement illustrate this phenomenon (Reference Kanie and BiermannKanie and Biermann, 2018). The Paris Agreement has catalyzed “hybrid multilateralism” where not only states but also a wide range of non- and sub-state actors contribute to the joint effort to reduce GHG emissions (Reference Bäckstrand and KuyperBäckstrand et al., 2017). These efforts have become increasingly relevant since current climate mitigation commitments undertaken by states are insufficient to achieve the goal of the Paris Agreement to limit the increase in the global mean temperature to 1.5°C compared to preindustrial levels. The Emissions Gap report by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP, 2022) demonstrates that the world is on a trajectory to increase average global temperature by 2.8°C by the end of the century compared to preindustrial levels, unless countries raise their ambitions and step up implementation of stated commitments. A growing number of non-state actors are not only demanding but also implementing climate action (Reference Lui, Kuramochi and SmitLui et al., 2021).
As soft and voluntary governance mechanisms and the role of non-state actors have gained traction in global climate governance, so has the conceptual toolbox deployed by researchers. Concepts such as “polycentrism,” “experimentalism,” “bottom-up approaches,” and “orchestration” capture the changing role of the state in the governance, orchestration, and steering of non-state and sub-state actors. Climate change is increasingly governed in a polycentric and fragmented context at multiple jurisdictional levels. Numerous actors, for example businesses and civil society organizations, engage across various sectors such as energy, transport, and industry (Reference Jordan, Huitema, Schoenefeld, van Asselt and ForsterJordan et al., 2018; Reference OstromOstrom, 2010). Yet, current achievements, pledges, and existing institutional frameworks at multilateral and domestic levels are not sufficient to achieve the goal of decarbonization.
Deep decarbonization for system-wide societal transformation in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement will require strengthened collaboration between state, non-state, and sub-state actors across multiple governance levels, geographical scales, sectors, and jurisdictional domains (Reference Bernstein and HoffmannBernstein and Hoffmann, 2019). The resulting collaborative governance setting will have various potentials and limitations in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy, and justice, which are key evaluative criteria of the outcomes of decarbonization, as illustrated in this chapter. We advance an analytical framework for understanding the relationship between the state, sub-state, and non-state actors in the politics and governance of decarbonization. The framework helps to explain how decarbonization is governed in a highly industrialized and advanced welfare state such as Sweden, which scholarly research has heralded as a leading green state (see Chapters 3 and 4). The analytical framework advances the research frontier on the politics of decarbonization by synthesizing interdisciplinary scholarship on (a) the politics and governance of deep decarbonization; (b) the state’s role in promoting deep decarbonization; and (c) the interaction between the state and non-state actors in achieving societal decarbonization. The framework fills a gap in the existing literature on transformative shifts, which is often dominated by techno-centric and market-oriented perspectives, while lacking elements of power, politics, and democracy, as well as political and social contestation and public legitimacy (Reference Jordan, Lorenzoni and TosunJordan et al., 2022; Reference Paterson, Tobin and VanDeveerPaterson et al., 2022; Reference Scoones, Leach and NewellScoones et al., 2015).
In what follows, we advance our analytical framework in three steps: First, we synthesize scholarship on the political challenges associated with decarbonization, such as various types of carbon lock-ins. In Section 2.3 , we examine the complex relationships between the state and various sub- and non-state actors, framed as collaborative climate governance. Section 2.4 outlines three evaluative themes – effectiveness, legitimacy, and justice – which can be used to assess the outcome of collaborative climate governance.
2.2 Governing toward Decarbonization: A Political Challenge
Long-term decarbonization goals, such as carbon neutrality or net-zero targets, are a relatively recent phenomenon (Reference Fankhauser, Smith and AllenFankhauser et al., 2022). The focus has shifted from incremental and short-term climate mitigation to more long-term societal transformation and deep decarbonization (Reference Allan, Roger and HaleAllan et al., 2021b; Reference Jordan, Lorenzoni and TosunJordan et al., 2022; Reference PattersonPatterson, 2022; Reference Paterson, Tobin and VanDeveerPaterson et al., 2022).
The scholarship on decarbonization and sustainability transformation has been dominated by managerial and techno-centric perspectives (Reference Scoones, Leach and NewellScoones et al., 2015). However, a growing body of literature calls for greater attention to be paid to political contestation around transformations (Reference Newell, Paterson and CraigNewell et al., 2021a; Reference PattersonPatterson, 2022), public support and resistance, as well as democratic promises and pitfalls (Reference Pickering, Bäckstrand and SchlosbergPickering et al., 2020). There is a turn toward addressing politics and power in the scholarship on sustainability transition and climate governance (Reference AvelinoAvelino, 2017; Reference Jordan, Lorenzoni and TosunJordan et al., 2022; Reference MarquardtMarquardt, 2017; Reference Paterson, Tobin and VanDeveerPaterson et al., 2022). Politics, power, and contestation need to be placed at the center of the analysis of the governance of decarbonization (Reference Avelino, Grin, Pel and JhagroeAvelino et al., 2016; Reference Marquardt, Fast and GrimmMarquardt et al., 2022; Reference Patterson, Schulz and VervoortPatterson et al., 2017; Reference Scoones, Leach and NewellScoones et al., 2015). The important role played by the state in the governance toward societal decarbonization is examined in the scholarship on the green and environmental state (Reference Bäckstrand and KronsellBäckstrand and Kronsell, 2015; Reference Eckersley, Hayes, Jinnah and KashwanEckersley, 2022; Reference Meadowcroft, Sowers, vanDeveer and WeinthalMeadowcroft, 2022).
We argue that actor relations must be studied more closely to understand the decarbonization process. Such a focus on actor relations will provide fruitful insights into different modes and strategies of governance and will shed light on the enablers and blockers of decarbonization. It also highlights the power dynamics that can explain why decarbonization pathways are unlikely to be smooth processes (Reference Stoddard, Anderson and CapstickStoddard et al., 2021). To demonstrate why these relations matter, we first distinguish between transitions and transformations before we introduce the different carbon lock-ins which need to be overcome.
2.2.1 Distinguishing Transitions from Transformations
Transitions and transformations should not be conflated. Sustainability transitions focus on various changes from unsustainable to sustainable systems in specific societal sectors, such as energy, transport, food, and water. The literature on socio-technical transitions and transition management is rooted in a variety of disciplines, most prominently economics and engineering. Scholars have generated insights into how transitions can occur through experiments and innovations at the “niche” level, “regime” changes, for example in the energy sector, and broader societal “landscape” developments (Reference GeelsGeels, 2010; Reference Geels and TurnheimGeels and Turnheim, 2022; Reference LoorbachLoorbach, 2007). A socio-technical transition involves a systemic shift to provide societal functions or services (food, transport, etc.) associated with different sets of technologies, social, and cultural practices, public policies, markets, and infrastructure (Reference GeelsGeels, 2019). For example, an incumbent fossil-fuel regime can be challenged and substituted by a “renewable energy regime” – resulting in a transition of the energy system. However, there is less understanding of the role of politics and power in achieving legitimate transitions pathways in some of the literature on socio-technical transitions (for an exception, see Reference Avelino, Grin, Pel and JhagroeAvelino et al., 2016).
Unlike the transitions literature, Reference PolanyiPolyani’s (2001) notion of the “Great Transformation” entails an overhaul of one sociopolitical system with another, exemplified by the transformation from feudalism to industrial capitalism. In climate change, such a transformation entails a shift from incremental GHG emission cuts and long-term and systemic large-scale interventions that go beyond technological advancements. A transformation involves deep and fundamental societal changes in class relations, social identity, energy and resource use, distribution of resources, and consumption patterns. The idea of eliminating fossil fuels by the end of the twenty-first century is an illustrative example (Reference PatersonPaterson, 2020). Similarly, the “great green transformation” implies a reversal of the destructive impact on the planetary system and deliberate efforts to secure planetary boundaries. Living within a “safe operating space for humanity” (Reference Rockström, Steffen and NooneRockström et al., 2009) requires a fundamental transformation of states, societies, and markets. However, change in one socio-technical system (for instance, the energy system) does not automatically challenge the capitalist growth paradigm that perpetuates material flows and negative environmental impacts (Reference EckersleyEckersley, 2019). Historically, economic growth has a linear relationship with global GHG emissions, although individual countries, such as Sweden, have managed to decouple emissions from economic development.
2.2.2 Carbon Lock-ins and Roadblocks to Decarbonization
Both transitions and transformations are confronted with a fossil-dependent system that must be overcome in light of the climate crisis. Efforts to decarbonize face many institutional and structural obstacles (Reference Stoddard, Anderson and CapstickStoddard et al., 2021), which are often summarized as carbon lock-ins (Reference Marquardt and NasiritousiMarquardt and Nasiritousi, 2022; Reference Seto, Davis and MitchellSeto et al., 2016; Reference UnruhUnruh, 2002). These carbon lock-ins are defined as the inertia of technologies, institutions, and behavior – by themselves or in interaction – constraining the rate of systemic transformation to a decarbonized or low-carbon society. Avoiding carbon lock-ins requires significant and large-scale investments, reforms, and legislation to unlock entrenched patterns of decision-making, norms and behavior, and institutional frameworks. Reference Seto, Davis and MitchellSeto and colleagues (2016, p. 427) argue that an interdependence between established infrastructures and technological choices (technological lock-ins), existing institutions and decision-making processes (institutional lock-in), as well as social norms, habits, and behavior (behavioral lock-in), stabilize fossil-fuel dependencies and result in high GHG emissions. Chapter 4 will examine the prevalence of these lock-ins in Sweden’s path to decarbonization. Institutional lock-in occurs as a result of past decisions of institutional design, which impact current institutions and the decision-making processes. These lock-in effects are associated with the governance, institutions, and decision-making processes related to fossil-fuel energy consumption and production. Institutional lock-in often occurs through conscious choices, whereby powerful economic, social, and political actors establish governance systems with the intention of influencing the outcome of these institutions. Technological lock-in results from the fact that the life span of physical or energy infrastructure is difficult or costly to change. They involve long lead times, with high initial costs for investments – such as offshore wind power – while payoffs occur later. “Energy demand patterns are locked in through large incremental investments in long-lasting built infrastructure, such as street layouts, land use patterns, and buildings, with the ultimate effect of inhibiting efforts to reduce the energy intensity of an economy” (Reference Seto, Davis and MitchellSeto et al., 2016, p. 427). Behavioral lock-in is associated with social norms, values, habits, and behavior related to fossil fuel and energy-intense goods and services. “Climate change is largely caused by unsustainable patterns in human behaviors, such as where we live, the size of homes we prefer, what we buy, and how we travel” (Reference Seto, Davis and MitchellSeto et al., 2016, p. 438). Because social norms and behaviors are very difficult to change, lock-in effects occur. In addition to the three lock-ins, economic lock-in can be added (Reference WilsonWilson, 2014). Economic lock-in stems from the path-dependence of carbon-intense economy amplified by economic globalization. The dependence on the global market can make it difficult to “break out” from profit maximization pathways (Reference WilsonWilson, 2014). There are also national and local economic lock-in effects, where the design of economic instruments, such as fossil-fuel subsidies, can counteract the implementation of emission reduction policies.
More recent studies have also identified discursive and imaginary lock-ins (Reference Buschmann and OelsBuschmann and Oels, 2019; Reference Marquardt and NasiritousiMarquardt and Nasiritousi, 2022) as obstacles toward decarbonization. Decarbonization not only depends on techno-economic scenarios, emission reduction pathways, and behavioral changes but also on the ability to (re)imagine what a fossil-free life, society, and future will mean for citizens and their low-carbon lifestyle (Reference PatersonPaterson, 2020). Beyond radical individualized activity (carbon footprints), there is a plethora of community-oriented low-carbon initiatives such as “transition towns” that place the actions of citizens in a community context with opportunities to scale-up decarbonization. Thus, decarbonization not only entails experimental and novel policies, technologies, business opportunities, and social practices but also captures an increase in bottom-up political action from citizens and movements in various sites to protest against fossil fuels, demand political change, and propose radical alternatives to the status quo in order to overcome imaginary lock-ins (Reference Marquardt and NasiritousiMarquardt and Nasiritousi, 2022).
Pathways to decarbonization face several roadblocks. Vested interests and ideological forces that promote business as usual are critical factors (Reference Stoddard, Anderson and CapstickStoddard et al., 2021). The rise of populism and nationalism (Reference LockwoodLockwood, 2018; Reference Marquardt and LedererMarquardt and Lederer, 2022), local resistance, and voter apathy challenge climate policy ambitions rolling back of climate legislation. Other common hurdles are short-termism, which is a key feature of all political systems, not least in liberal democracies when politicians need to secure reelection and citizens prioritize near-term benefits such as jobs and security rather than long-term public goods, such as curbing climate change. Short-termism is exacerbated in times of crises, including economic crises, inflation and recession, pandemics, and Russia’s war against Ukraine. These crises can open up – or close down – windows of opportunity for political change toward mitigating climate change. On the one hand, they act as potential threats to progressive climate politics, as they undermine the relevance and urgency of long-term and global common challenges such as climate change as opposed to an acute, direct, and highly visible threat such as war or a pandemic. Although climate change is already impacting many people around the world, current governments’ responses to the climate crisis are characterized by short-term time horizon and voluntary commitments. On the other hand, acute crises can be used as an opportunity for a progressive climate change agenda. A crisis can shift priorities and enable change that was previously considered impossible (Reference StarkStark, 2018). These disruptive events can become “critical junctures” (Reference Capoccia and KelemenCapoccia and Kelemen, 2007) or “windows of opportunity” (Reference KingdonKingdon, 2003) for political reforms. They can overcome carbon lock-ins, accelerate the search for alternatives to fossil fuels, help reduce carbon footprints, and promote greener investments (see Chapter 3 on how Sweden dealt with the oil crises and Chapter 9 on how COVID-19 affects the activities of climate networks).
Democracies in particular face limits in delivering deep, rapid, and broad decarbonization (Reference Pickering, Hickmann and BäckstrandPickering et al., 2022). One strategy is depoliticization, that is, politicians use devices such as independent climate policy councils or carbon budgets to commit politicians to decarbonization and isolate them from electoral cycles (Reference Paterson, Tobin and VanDeveerPaterson et al., 2022). However, politicians are reluctant to adopt binding emissions as public support for society-wide decarbonization varies between countries (Reference Bernauer and McGrathBernauer and McGrath, 2016). Political action on climate change requires support and buy-in not only from citizens but also from various societal actors such as business, trade unions, and civil society. Breaking carbon lock-ins thus entails building up momentum toward decarbonization by involving non-state actors in collaborative climate governance. This necessitates a focus on relations between the state and non-state actors and paying attention to the power dynamics between them. In order to achieve this, we propose an analytical framework to evaluate outcomes of collaborative governance arrangements.
2.3 Collaborative Climate Governance: Interactions between the State and Non-state Actors
While the Paris Agreement was celebrated as a milestone in international climate diplomacy, it also became clear that states are unlikely to sufficiently tackle the climate crisis on their own. The Paris Agreement through its global stocktake encourages non-state actors to actively contribute to mitigate climate change and close the emissions gap left by states (Reference Kuyper and TørstadKuyper and Tørstad, 2023). Due to its authority and capacity to foster large-scale transformations (Reference Gough and MeadowcroftGough and Meadowcroft, 2011), the state is considered a key actor in domestic and international climate governance. Mobilizing support from all levels and sectors of society and addressing conflicts require states to regulate, orchestrate and convene collaborative climate governance in a multilevel context (Reference Duit, Feindt and MeadowcroftDuit et al., 2016; Reference EckersleyEckersley, 2004; Reference Meadowcroft, Steinberg and VanDeveerMeadowcroft, 2012). No actor or institution in society equals the state with its regulatory capacity to engage in collective action in order to redirect material flows, reduce environmental impact, redistribute resources, secure welfare and public goods, regulate markets, and strengthen equality. Consequently, in international negotiations and domestic contexts alike, states are pivotal actors in steering and governing toward decarbonized societies.
The state is not a monolithic actor but is shaped by numerous internal struggles, interests, and compromises. Its key role in environmental politics, decarbonization, and sustainability transformation has been a key research topic for more than two decades (Reference Johnstone and NewellJohnstone and Newell, 2018). The state has the capacity to steer and enable change, but also delay and hinder decarbonization efforts. Recent developments such as green industrial policies, green deals, and a circular economy assign the state a more active role in decarbonization (Reference Mazzucato, Scoones, Leach and NewellMazzucato, 2015; Reference MecklingMeckling, 2021). Furthermore, renewed attention is being paid to the state in promoting industrial decarbonization (Reference Åhman, Nilsson and JohanssonÅhman et al., 2017; Reference Allan, Lewis and OatleyAllan et al., 2021a; Reference Hildingsson, Kronsell and KhanHildingsson et al. 2019). As examined in Chapter 3, member states in the European Union have collectively agreed to the European Green Deal and Climate Law, followed by the adoption of “Fit for 55” – an unprecedented climate legislation package to accelerate decarbonization and green industrialization (Reference Oberthür and von HomeyerOberthür and von Homeyer, 2023). While recognizing the complexity of statehood, we treat the state as a single actor with multiple relations to other societal groups such as businesses, civil society, and subnational authorities (see also Reference Duit, Feindt and MeadowcroftDuit et al., 2016 on the dimensions of statehood). Building on previous work about the state’s role in governing toward decarbonization, we analyze how the state bridges societal divides, mediates between different interests, and acts as a orchestrator and regulator of sub-state and non-state climate action.
To theorize the multiple relations between the state and non-state actors in decarbonization, we build on previous research about collaborative governance. Collaborative governance refers to an institutional setting “where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Reference Ansell and GashAnsell and Gash, 2008). Such a collaborative ambition not only reflects the shift to a facilitative post-Paris climate regime at the international level that relies on soft and voluntary steering and orchestration (Reference Bäckstrand and KuyperBäckstrand et al., 2017), it is also an inherent part of consensus-oriented democratic welfare states like Sweden, which build on collaborative efforts to tackle political issues (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, this collaborative approach to decarbonization is not free from contestation and critique.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the analytical framework that guides our empirical research in the subsequent chapters. We refer to collaborative climate governance as constellations of individuals and networks of civil society actors, cities, and businesses taking on or demanding voluntary climate commitments. Collaborative climate governance takes place in a multilevel governance context in regional (e.g., the EU) and international (e.g., at the UNFCCC) settings, in which both states and intergovernmental organizations steer non-state climate action (e.g., illustrated by the United Nations Global Climate Action Portal). In the analytical framework, we illustrate four different relationships between the state, sub-, and non-state actors under a collaborative governance setting in Sweden. First, regulation refers to efforts by the state to enact legislation, rules, and procedures to induce non-state actors to implement the adopted goals, for instance, through a binding climate act. Second, orchestration describes forms of indirect steering by the state via intermediaries such as multi-stakeholder platforms and partnerships set up to mobilize voluntary climate commitments by various actors. Third, lobbying and agenda setting recognize that non-state and subnational actors also aim to influence the state to accelerate or block climate action. They either demand more ambitious climate targets or obstruct by lowering their climate ambitions. Fourth, contestation refers to open conflicts and confrontation by non-state actors targeting the state.
Figure 2.1 Analytical framework on the interaction between state and non-state actors in collaborative climate governance.
Figure 2.1 simplifies the collaborative governance setting under which these relations play out between the state and the landscape of non- and sub-state actors, coalitions, and networks of actors, as well as the multi-stakeholder partnerships that will be explored in this book. While the collaborative setting is a key feature of a welfare state like Sweden (see Chapters 3 and 4 for more details), the flip side of the consensual corporativist state is confrontation, resistance, and opposition. For example, civil society actors challenge what they perceive as the state’s slow and incremental approach to decarbonization, and fossil-fuel industries resist attempts to change their business models.
To discuss and assess the effects of collaborative climate governance, we focus on three evaluative themes: effectiveness, legitimacy, and justice. This allows us to evaluate if and how these three themes are addressed in collaborative climate governance, but also assess their outcomes in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy, and justice (Section 2.4).
2.3.1 Regulation
States are responsible for structuring political, economic, and social relations. They maintain legal frameworks (such as property rights), have coercive power, deploy economic and administrative power through bureaucratic agencies, and have a mandate to negotiate and enter into binding international agreements. The state’s executive and political authority to manage global collective action problems makes it the primary actor and uniquely positioned to tackle climate change (Reference Bäckstrand and KronsellBäckstrand and Kronsell, 2015; Reference Eckersley, Hayes, Jinnah and KashwanEckersley, 2022). Welfare states in particular have the authority to allocate and redistribute resources, provide social services, and protect public goods. Hence, the welfare state is the most likely candidate to be a green state (Reference Meadowcroft, Steinberg and VanDeveerMeadowcroft, 2012). A core function of a green (welfare) state is to regulate “public bads,” such as climate change and its extension. A decarbonized state commits to prevent climate change, and to govern the decarbonization of the society and the economy (Reference Hildingsson, Khan, Bäckstrand and KronsellHildingsson and Khan, 2015). Consequently, regulating the behavior of non- and sub-state actors plays a central role in the state’s efforts to decarbonize society.
The state has expanded its mandate from protecting environmental and natural resources in the 1960s to steering and governing society toward a circular economy, green industrialization, decarbonization, and sustainability transitions in the 2020s (Reference Allan, Roger and HaleAllan et al., 2021b). With the advent of the climate crisis, the role of the state has been broadened from intervening to preventing harmful environmental impacts and reducing emissions, toward promoting deep decarbonization (Reference Bäckstrand and KronsellBäckstrand and Kronsell, 2015). State intervention to achieve decarbonization is increasingly perceived as a legitimate exercise of public power (Reference Duit, Feindt and MeadowcroftDuit et al., 2016; Reference EckersleyEckersley, 2019). The rapid growth of climate acts, climate laws, and national climate councils around the world epitomizes the expanded role of the state to govern and intervene to achieve goals of decarbonization (Reference Eskander and FankhauserEskander and Fankhauser, 2020). Governments in many countries increasingly adopt net-zero targets to accelerate decarbonization (Reference Green and ReyesGreen and Reyes, 2023; Reference Hale, Smith and BlackHale et al., 2022).
2.3.2 Orchestration
In non-musical terminology, orchestration assumes an agent that is willing and able to coordinate a group of people or organizations, directing them toward a common goal and purpose. Various academic disciplines have used slightly different interpretations of orchestration as a concept, but here we adhere to the ideas developed by Abbott and Snidal (and elaborated by others), who use it to describe an observed phenomenon when international organizations use intermediaries to pursue their interests (to the extent to which international organizations can have autonomous interests) (Reference Abbott and SnidalAbbott and Snidal, 2009). Orchestration has been widely used to analyze how international organizations and states mobilize non-state action in climate diplomacy (Reference Bäckstrand and KuyperBäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017; Reference Hale and RogerHale and Roger, 2014; Reference Hickmann, Widerberg, Lederer and PattbergHickmann et al., 2021). Orchestration is increasingly employed to describe national initiatives to mobilize various actors to engage in mitigating and adapting to climate change, and Sweden has been at the forefront of such developments (Reference Chan, Ellinger and WiderbergChan et al., 2018a; Reference Nasiritousi and GrimmNasiritousi and Grimm, 2022).
The orchestration model – also called the O-I-T model – developed by Abbott and colleagues – consists of three components: an Orchestrator (e.g., a national government, the EU or the UNFCCC) that aims to steer a target group (e.g., industries, cities, or other organizations), using an Intermediary (e.g., a multi-stakeholder partnership or other cross-sectoral initiative) (Reference Abbott, Genschel, Snidal and ZanglAbbott et al., 2015). Orchestration is a case of indirect governance and can be juxtaposed with “delegation,” which is based on the control of agents through laws, regulation, and decrees, where the principal can punish the agent for not adhering to the former’s wishes. Orchestration relies on soft governance measures, including voluntary action and organization by the involved parties, through material and ideational support such as funding, convening power, or other forms of know-how.
While orchestration offers a compelling case for engaging a broad variety of actors in developing and implementing answers to complex societal problems such as climate change, it also comes with a set of challenges. First, the voluntary nature of orchestration makes implementation and effectiveness uncertain. In the event that stakeholders are unwilling to engage and set up stringent and ambitious goals in line with scientific targets and international commitments, there are few instruments available for the orchestrator to impose their will. Second, it is unclear how the legitimation of orchestration initiatives fares compared to more traditional forms of regulation with a clear principal-agent structure (Reference Nasiritousi and GrimmNasiritousi and Grimm, 2022). Related to the second question, legitimacy and accountability are challenged in orchestration as it might lead to a situation in which everyone and therefore no one is responsible for the implementation of climate governance (Reference Bäckstrand and KuyperBäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017).
2.3.3 Lobbying and Advocacy Strategies
The state possesses unique power and authority to engage in collective action with a capacity to allocate and distribute resources and public goods and respond to free-rider problems. Democratic welfare states in particular – through enhanced democratic legitimacy and their institutional capacity – are well positioned to intervene, regulate markets, and negotiate between labour, business, and civil society (Reference Meadowcroft, Steinberg and VanDeveerMeadowcroft, 2012). In liberal democracies with open markets, however, states not only act as powerful regulators but use a variety of mechanisms to engage with businesses, civil society actors, and other stakeholders. For instance, states can incentivize climate-friendly business models, promote success cases, and support market-driven technological development. Businesses, in contrast, aim to influence or push the state through lobbying, agenda setting, and voluntary pledges. Scholarship has documented many instances of lobbying by companies on issues related to climate change (Reference BrulleBrulle, 2018; Reference Delmas, Lim and Nairn-BirchDelmas, et al. 2016; Reference Kolk and PinkseKolk and Pinkse, 2007). While some companies and trade associations frequently work to obstruct or weaken climate policies, others see value in more stringent climate policies and can therefore push for the adoption of more effective climate policies (Reference Delmas, Lim and Nairn-BirchDelmas et al. 2016). Lobbying can take place either by directly seeking to influence politicians and civil servants, for example through meetings, funding, or strategic exchanges, or indirectly through mobilizing other actors through the media or strategic campaigns.
Similarly, civil society groups are actively seeking to influence different actors in society through various advocacy strategies. Such examples include climate activism through protests and climate litigations, as well as campaigns targeting businesses, politicians, or citizens (Reference Fisher and NasrinFisher and Nasrin, 2021). They can employ insider strategies by engaging with the political system or outsider strategies through protests and demonstrations (Reference BetzoldBetzold, 2013). In recent years, the youth movement has started to organize school strikes and has engaged in promoting both moderate and radical strategies and ideas (Reference MarquardtMarquardt, 2020).
Cities and municipalities have also been identified as actors with lobbying power. Through both domestic and transnational networks, they can seek to influence policies that are decided at other governance levels (Reference KernKern, 2019). Accordingly, the state engages in complex relations with actors at different stages of the policy cycle. It can manage these relations in different ways, including through attempting to influence the different lobby groups (Reference Lucas, Hanegraaff and De BruyckerLucas et al., 2019).
2.3.4 Contestation
The end of fossil fuels and the transformation to a decarbonized society are contested and met with resistance by incumbent actors and institutions and entrenched norms and values (Reference Patterson, Schulz and VervoortPatterson et al., 2017 p. 16). Decarbonization is likely to lead to confrontation with more agonistic politics targeting the fossil-fuel industry as an enemy (Reference MachinMachin, 2013; Reference PatersonPaterson, 2020; Reference Paterson, Tobin and VanDeveerPaterson et al., 2022). Attempts to regulate fossil-fuel consumption and production in one country may also be undermined by other countries that free-ride on the climate mitigation efforts of more ambitious governments. In addition, social movements protest at sites of pipeline development to prevent extraction and keep fossil fuels in the ground. In global climate politics, numerous activists advocate for a global climate treaty to phase out fossil fuels (Reference Newell and SimmsNewell and Simms, 2020).
The state can build progressive coalitions to challenge incumbent interest groups and veto powers to overcome carbon lock-ins and phase out fossil fuels (Reference Seto, Davis and MitchellSeto et al., 2016). At the same time, the state is responsible for ecological degradation and the extraction of fossil fuels. The state has resisted more ambitious climate change action and also delayed or even dismantled climate policy. Put differently, the state can either actively regulate and orchestrate societal transformations toward decarbonization or perpetuate fossil-fuel dependency, incumbent fossil-fuel interests, and carbon lock-in. Civil society organizations and social movements like Fridays for Future (FFF) or Extinction Rebellion play an important role in pushing states to commit to more ambitious climate action. They raise public awareness of inaction, mobilize support for change, and demand action to solve the climate crisis.
Welfare states employ various strategies to deal with the pressure from social movements, but their ability to govern decarbonization is restricted by at least four structural constraints (Reference Meadowcroft, Sowers, vanDeveer and WeinthalMeadowcroft, 2022). First, the capitalist foundation is central to states – non-democracies and democracies alike. This requires continuous economic growth and material expansion, which, in turn, will lead to adverse climate impacts. Second, the welfare state imperative captures the state’s dependency on growth and stable state revenues to ensure the provision of welfare. This is essential for the political bargain between the government, industry, and trade unions. Radical no-growth or low-growth policies (Reference KochKoch, 2020) would challenge social and political stability, which rests on maintaining public legitimacy. Third, the international system of weak intergovernmental agreements and multilateral institutions has limited authority to address the problem of global collective action. As states are embedded in global commodity chains and trade relations, they face hurdles in unilateral decarbonization. There is a challenge regarding the displacement of GHG emissions and the export of consumption-based emissions, as well as the regulation of transnational capital. Fourth, liberal representative democracy is susceptible to vested interests and incumbent powers, such as business and trade unions tied to fossil energy. They can act as veto players and resist large-scale decarbonization (Reference MildenbergerMildenberger, 2020). Social movements challenge these structural constraints, as illustrated by the rise of the climate justice movement, FFF, and ongoing climate litigation against states all over the world (Reference Peel and OsofskyPeel and Osofsky, 2020).
2.4 Evaluating Collaborative Climate Governance: Effectiveness, Legitimacy, and Justice
Regulation, orchestration, lobbying, and contestation describe four main relationships between the state and non-state actors in collaborative climate governance. We now turn to three evaluative themes to evaluate this complex interplay: First, effectiveness is crucial for any climate mitigation effort. Roadmaps, pledges, and commitments need to be effectively implemented to achieve climate targets. Global crises and external shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can potentially disrupt decarbonization efforts. Second, questions of legitimacy and public support are critical for rapid societal decarbonization, which is also linked to democratic challenges to govern a global collective action problem such as climate change. Finally, decarbonization goes beyond technical innovations and market mechanisms and is intertwined with the distributional issues, justice concerns, resistance, and societal struggles. Thus, it is crucial to consider forms of political resistance and disruption. While these three evaluative themes are interrelated, we separate them here for analytical purposes. For instance, effective decarbonization relies on building public support for decarbonization and ensuring a fair and just distributions of the costs and benefits of climate mitigation.
2.4.1 Effectiveness
Given the urgency of the climate crisis, any ambition to reduce GHG emissions needs to be effectively implemented. Effectiveness is a notoriously difficult concept for empirical research (Reference Nasiritousi, Sanderink, Skovgaard, Zelli, Bäckstrand, Nasiritousi, Skovgaard and WiderbergNasiritousi et al., 2020), but according to a common conceptualization, it can be assessed through three dimensions: output, outcome, and impact (Reference EastonEaston, 1965). Output refers to what is produced to address a problem, outcome refers to behavioral changes toward addressing a problem, and impact is a measure of the extent to which a problem is alleviated. Output is thus meant to effect behavioral changes, which, in turn, alleviate the problem that it was supposed to address. Output, such as policies, is often used as a proxy for effectiveness since it is difficult to measure outcome and impact. This can be seen, for example, in studies that assess the effectiveness of non-state climate action (Reference Chan, Falkner, Goldberg and van AsseltChan et al., 2018b; Reference Hale, Chan and HsuHale et al., 2021; Reference Hsu, Brandt, Widerberg, Chan and WeinfurterHsu et al., 2020).
Another approach is to use expert assessments of effectiveness (Reference Nasiritousi, Sanderink, Skovgaard, Zelli, Bäckstrand, Nasiritousi, Skovgaard and WiderbergNasiritousi et al., 2020). A third approach is to assess stakeholder perceptions of effectiveness in line with the literature on output legitimacy (Reference Bäckstrand, Kuyper and NasiritousiBäckstrand et al., 2021). Those approaches that rely on subjective assessments naturally fall victim to the “eye of the beholder” problem, whereby different actors have varying perceptions of what effectiveness is and whether it has been achieved (Reference Gutner and ThompsonGutner and Thompson, 2010). Assessing effectiveness based on perceptions can differ depending on how the problem to be solved is defined and the norms of those who cast judgment. Again, it is important to not only examine whether different collaborative climate governance processes are (perceived as) effective but also study the outcomes of collaborative climate governance in terms of actual effectiveness, for instance in terms of emission reductions.
It is particularly difficult to assess the effectiveness of collaborative climate governance because reductions in GHG emissions are driven by a broad set of societal factors. For instance, crises and external shocks could impact not only how collaborative climate governance is undertaken but also its outcomes. A case in point is the COVID-19 pandemic. In its aftermath, politicians promised a green recovery to create more sustainable societies and “build back better” economies around the world. Various green deals were promoted to underline that the COVID-19 crisis should be followed by a climate-friendly recovery. Along these lines, the pandemic would act as an external shock that could speed up decarbonization plans.
2.4.2 Legitimacy
Creating legitimacy for climate action and ensuring its effective implementation are two key challenges that states face in their efforts to govern and steer toward decarbonization. Governments have to balance intractable goal conflicts between imperatives of capital accumulation (to secure state revenues and employment) and democratic legitimation (such as responding to the concerns of citizens about the climate crisis) (Reference EckersleyEckersley, 2019; Reference Eckersley2020). Others argue that modern capitalist democracies and consumer societies are inherently incapable of overcoming multiple sustainability crises (Reference HausknostHausknost, 2020). A related legitimacy challenge is to secure democratic values such as transparency, fairness, inclusion, representation, and accountability in decarbonization (Reference Bäckstrand and KuyperBäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017).
Sceptics argue that democratic states are too slow, institutionally fragmented, and susceptible to lobbying by fossil interests to respond to climate change and manage large-scale decarbonization (Reference Pickering, Hickmann and BäckstrandPickering et al., 2022). The relationship between democratization and a reduction in GHG emissions is complex, and the empirical evidence is mixed regarding whether democracies are more effective in combating climate change compared to authoritarian regimes or dictatorships. Some research indicates that the transition to democratic regimes does not significantly impact emission reductions (Reference Chesler, Javeline, Peh and ScoginChesler et al., 2023; Reference PovitkinaPovitkina, 2018). In contrast, other comparative empirical assessments on the relationship between democracy and climate change suggest that democracies and deliberative systems exhibit better climate performance than non-democratic and authoritarian states (Reference Selseng, Linnerud and HoldenSelseng et al., 2022; Reference Willis, Curato and SmithWillis et al., 2022).
One of the advantages of democracy is that it is better at ensuring accountability, inclusion, and representation, which are crucial values in achieving a decarbonized society. Such values are important for ensuring legitimacy and support for ongoing transformations. Legitimacy broadly refers to “the acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community” (Reference BernsteinBernstein, 2012, p. 142). To ensure compliance, the state’s governance of decarbonization not only needs to conform to the aforementioned values and principles but also needs to be perceived as legitimate by a broad segment of stakeholders (Reference Buchanan and KeohaneBuchanan and Keohane, 2006). To understand the legitimacy of a political order in practice, it is necessary to examine the perceptions of legitimacy among a set of actors. The differences in how actors perceive legitimacy may be due to different legitimacy demands or different heuristics and norms among them (Reference Lenz, Burilkov and ViolaLenz et al., 2019). It is important to understand the perceptions of actors since perceptions determine how actors react to and mobilize around issues pertaining to decarbonization. If actors display low legitimacy beliefs in climate action, the state is likely to face more resistance and opposition when it adopts climate and decarbonization policies. Key policies may lack legitimacy if they are viewed as unjust by a large segment of the public. For collaborative climate governance, not only is it important to examine whether different governance processes effectively achieve the agreed climate goals and targets, it is also crucial to study whether the outcomes of collaborative climate governance are legitimate.
2.4.3 Justice
Political economists argue that the transformation from a fossil-dependent to a fossil-free society is likely to be contested (Reference Johnstone and NewellJohnstone and Newell, 2018). Actors with vested interests in preserving the status quo will resist change; the costs and benefits of decarbonization may be unevenly distributed, and currently disenfranchised groups risk being excluded from the process (Reference Scoones, Leach and NewellScoones et al., 2015). The public acceptance of stringent climate policies is affected by rising fuel prices and energy poverty amplified during economic recessions, war, and political crises. The significance of the social and political struggles that are associated with decarbonization is evident in calls for climate justice and just (energy) transitions (Reference Jenkins, Sovacool, Błachowicz and LauerJenkins et al., 2020). Climate justice covers a multitude of dimensions related to the justice implications of the climate regime (Reference OkerekeOkereke, 2010). In general, it refers to a fair and equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of addressing climate change. This includes ensuring that the most vulnerable populations, such as low-income communities and people of color, are not disproportionately impacted by the decarbonization of society. In early debates, justice concerns were largely conceptualized in terms of burden sharing for mitigating, which includes questions of compensation and the distribution of responsibilities when it comes to the cost of climate change (Reference IkemeIkeme, 2003). This also includes systemic injustices, which relate to patterns of inequity due to historical developments and power relations (Reference ShueShue, 1993).
Scholarly debates have diversified over the years, particularly in terms of procedural, distributional, recognition-based, and intergenerational justice. While procedural climate justice sheds light on access to information, meaningful participation, and forms of exclusion (Reference Sovacool and DworkinSovacool and Dworkin, 2014), distributional climate justice relates to how the costs and benefits of decarbonization are allocated across society (Reference Sovacool, Martiskainen, Hook and BakerSovacool et al., 2019). Closely related to this, recognition-based justice sheds light on how marginalized groups can be guaranteed “a fair representation of their views without distortion or fears of reprisal of their views” (Reference Newell, Srivastava, Naess, Torres Contreras and PriceNewell et al., 2021b). Finally, intergenerational justice is not only central to recent youth-led climate movements such as FFF, but efforts to represent future generations have also reached parliaments, for example in Israel, Finland, and Chile (Reference Gonzalez‐Ricoy and ReyGonzalez‐Ricoy and Rey, 2019). At the same time, climate justice faces new struggles in light of recent threats to democracy and multilateralism, such as rising populism and global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Reference Leach, MacGregor, Scoones and WilkinsonLeach et al., 2021).
Achieving both climate justice and decarbonization through just transition will require a concerted effort from governments, businesses, civil society, and citizens (Reference Newell, Daley, Mikheeva and PešaNewell et al., 2023). This will involve policies and practices that prioritize the needs of marginalized communities and address the root causes of climate change. The decarbonization process will create winners and losers in the short term. Such gains and losses need to be not only in monetary terms but also in procedural and cultural terms. Thus, the outcomes of collaborative climate governance should be assessed through different lenses of justice. At the same time, power relations in collaborative climate governance mean that it is important to examine justice considerations. This entails studying who is involved and who gets listened to. Recognizing these complex justice concerns resulting from efforts to decarbonize, we concur with Reference Newell, Srivastava, Naess, Torres Contreras and PriceNewell and colleagues (2021b), who call for a transformative approach to climate justice that places power relationships at the center of its enquiry.
2.5 Conclusion
Governing toward decarbonization is a complex undertaking that involves multiple actors in a multilevel governance context. Understanding the politics, practices, and processes that drive the transformation to a fossil-free society requires an in-depth examination of the interplay between the state and non-state actors. The state – with its capacity to respond to global collective action problems – is uniquely positioned to govern and steer non-state actors to achieve deep and rapid decarbonization. This chapter has advanced an analytical framework on collaborative climate governance, which focuses on the interplay between the state and non-state actors in decarbonization. In particular, we highlight regulation, orchestration, lobbying, and contestation as critical relationships in the interaction between the state and non-state actors. The framework includes three evaluative themes on the interplay between the state and non-state actors, namely effectiveness, legitimacy, and justice. In the framework, we integrate the three themes to assess the outcomes of decarbonization, which are often treated separately. The remaining chapters will address the evaluative themes and empirically explore the interplay between the state and non-state actors in various case studies ranging from city networks, multi-stakeholder partnerships, and business associations to civil society organizations.
We have theorized the multiple ways in which the state governs and steers collaborative climate governance and responds to resistance, confrontation, and contestation. By bringing together the scholarship of the environmental state and state–non-state interactions in the context of large-scale decarbonization, it becomes clear that visions of what a decarbonized society would ultimately look like are politically contested. The roadblocks to decarbonization and the various carbon lock-ins are not only created by the institutions and actors rooted in fossil energy systems but also rest on norms, ideas, and political ideologies. Achieving a fully decarbonized society depends on political ideologies that form the basis of what we are capable of imagining. Such considerations also fuel different visions of the dynamics of state–non-state relations in achieving deep decarbonization.
By advancing a framework for evaluating the interplay between state and non-state actors and evaluating the outcomes of decarbonization, this chapter has opened up the black box of the politics of decarbonization and transformation to fossil-free society. The themes will be empirically illustrated in the following chapters on Sweden’s pathway to decarbonization in a multilevel governance context.
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