Why do states pursue different policies in response to international agreements? This chapter recaps from previous sections to explain how the findings in this study on the Kimberley Process can be used to understand the role of international agreements more generally. Since the Kimberley Process is often indecisive, it is an interesting puzzle why states, even those that often ignore international agreements, will use scarce resources to raise their level of compliance with the Kimberley Process. This chapter recaps the major findings from the five diamond-wealthy countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are examined: Angola, Central African Republic, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. These cases provide a large variation in compliance and cooperation with the Kimberley Process, due to the extent that diamond dependency constrains the ability of state actors to implement their preferences surrounding policy, the preferences of private actors, and the relative amount of power within and between these groups. This research shows that state responses to international agreements can be best understood as a process that takes place domestically as different actors compete to get their policy preferences implemented and domestic economic changes lead to changes in policy implementation.