Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Equilibrium political repression
- 3 The tinpot and the totalitarian
- 4 Tyranny and timocracy
- 5 A more general model
- Part III Economics of autocracy
- Part IV The dynamics of dictatorship
- Part V Conclusion
- References
- Name index
- Subject index
5 - A more general model
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Equilibrium political repression
- 3 The tinpot and the totalitarian
- 4 Tyranny and timocracy
- 5 A more general model
- Part III Economics of autocracy
- Part IV The dynamics of dictatorship
- Part V Conclusion
- References
- Name index
- Subject index
Summary
Introduction
All the elements that affect the dictator's behavior are now in place. To begin with, we know some things about his or her personality. Such leaders tend to be paranoid, because they lack reliable information about what their people are really thinking about them. One of their chief concerns is staying in office, and to this end, they are engaged with more or less frequency (depending on the type of dictatorship) in buying loyalty and implementing repressive measures in order to do so. We know less about their subjects, but we do know that as long as they are at all numerous – and especially if they are unorganized – the benefits to each one of overthrowing the dictator will be small compared with the potential costs. This free-rider problem helps dictators immensely in the task of staying in office, but it doesn't solve it completely, and under the right circumstances they can be deposed, as dictators often are. This can happen in a number of ways:
by a cabal of associates, including those closest to the leader
through the loss of support of powerful bureaucracies, especially the army
by a revolt of the mob
through the intervention of foreign powers.
The behavior of a dictator's subjects was modeled in Chapter 3 as follows. Each subject faces a choice between supporting and opposing the regime.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Political Economy of Dictatorship , pp. 106 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998